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Abstract

From August 1945 to September 1951, the United States had a unique opportunity to
define and frame how it would approach its foreign relations in the Asia-Pacific region. As the
dominant power in the Pacific after World War II and claiming direct authority over vanquished
Japan, the United States had the liberty to design its own post-war vision for the entire region.
Until 1951, American State Department diplomats and government planners, attempted—
ultimately unsuccessfully—to harmonize the competing motivations of lingering World War II
multilateralist idealism and Cold War geopolitics in a postcolonial, postwar world. This thesis
examines U.S.-Korean relations in context of how both sides grappled with the requirements of
addressing a history of colonialism and wartime sacrifice, which came to be overshadowed by
American Cold War-inflected concerns. U.S. policymakers ultimately shelved multilateralist
defense schemes such as the Pacific Pact, which would have been a NATO in Asia. Through a
series of short-term tactical decisions, U.S. diplomats also transformed the San Francisco Peace
Treaty with Japan from a post-war agreement of reconciliation and moral redress into a Cold
War device that would reinstate Japanese strategic advantages, albeit under American control.
Emblematic of this shift was the exclusion of Korea from both the peace treaty itself and its
complementary defense negotiations. State Department officials avoided the responsibility of
resolving persisting wartime issues even while attempting to implement a new postwar vision for
Asia. U.S. diplomats had long-standing racialized assumptions about Korean cultural and
political inferiority which corresponded with Americans’ growing distaste for rehashing the
legacy of Japanese imperialism in Asia. The stark reality was that Cold War geopolitics had left
little room for long-term multilateralist visions for the future. By failing to address Korean
concerns in the San Francisco Peace Treaty and its complementary defense structure, the U.S. in
turn generated a postwar design for the Asia-Pacific guided solely by efforts to maximize
American tactical advantages in both diplomatic and military contexts, to its long-term
detriment.
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“And yet it seems to me the line between a just peace and an unjust war is very faint indeed.”
“No matter how repulsive the peace, it is still vital to guard it. It may be an immoral peace,
maybe an unjust peace, but I’d take an unjust peace over a just war any day.”

-A dialogue between Arakawa and Goto, from Patlabor 2: The Movie.
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Introduction

John Foster Dulles was a devout Christian, a skilled lawyer, and a fan of old rye whiskey.
Alcohol consumption was sprinkled throughout Dulles’ drafting sessions, meetings with his
staff, and even negotiations with foreign governments. In February 1951, Dulles notably took
offense when, in the middle of a break between negotiating sessions with the Australian
government, his Australian host only offered him orange soda.1 Yet those who knew Dulles were
split on their opinions of him. Two different State Department bureaucrats, each of whom
worked with Dulles in different capacities, posthumously assessed the austere cabinet member as
“standoffish, cold, and insular-minded” and “warm, personable, and adaptable,” respectively.2
Dulles, or Foster Dulles as his friends called him, experienced firsthand the evolution of
U.S. foreign relations as his country publicly shifted away from an isolationist mantra towards
global commitment. His political career intersected and strongly influenced this arc in American
foreign policy. As a young lawyer he had served as a staffer for the American delegation to the
1919 Paris Peace conference. With his own forays into domestic politics he gained experience
attempting to sell a foreign policy platform to a skeptical public. In the span of four years from
1948 to 1952, Dulles advised the U.S. delegation to the UN, served as special advisor to the State
Department, oversaw the negotiation of the peace treaty with Japan, and became Secretary of
State under the Eisenhower administration. In a retroactive examination, Dulles was a foremost

1

Spender, Sir Percy (1897-1985) - Australian Ambassador to the United States, John
Foster Dulles Oral History Collection, MC017, Public Policy Papers, Rare Books and Special
Collections, Princeton University Library, Princeton, New Jersey.
2

Butterworth, W. Walton (1903-1975), 1965, JFD Oral History Collection; Allison, John
M. (1905-1978), 1969, JFD Oral History Collection.
1
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witness and a key shaper of the transformation of Wilsonian internationalism, to Rooseveltian
multilateralism, to Cold War realism.
Dulles did not keep a diary. His various publications may act as clues to aspects of his
worldview, but it is difficult to parse what was surface and what was inner reality. To uncritically
accept all descriptions of who he was would be to deal with mind-bending contradictions: a
Presbyterian Christian with little patience for human rights concerns, a vociferous antiCommunist who stood by a think tank accused of having Communist ties, a diplomat motivated
to improve upon the mistakes of President Wilson in 1919 but heedless of the loss of Wilsonian
spirit with his own treaty negotiations.3 Dulles’ centrality to the story of the 1951 San Francisco
Peace Treaty seemingly plants an enigmatic figure in the way of our scholarship of American
foreign policy in this period. The necessity of a certain amount of speculation about Dulles’
worldview complicates what we may conclude about the influence of this one individual on the
broader set of political or diplomatic results. It is necessary then, to move away from this one
individual as we investigate the events with which he intertwined.
Individuals, especially government officials, are vital agents in diplomatic history. Yet it
is a persistent assumption that they were solely rational actors, insulated from crosscontamination of broader social and cultural ideas. Often, a preexisting cultural assumption
served to justify, and was justified by, the policy prescriptions that emerged from a rational,

For a discussion of Dulles’ religious influences, see Toulouse, Mark G. The
Transformation of John Foster Dulles. (Mercer University Press: 1985), esp. 3-26 and
Immerman, Richard H. John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in U.S. Foreign
Policy. (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1999); Prussen details Dulles’ activities in the Paris
Peace conference. Pruessen, Ronald W. John Foster Dulles: The Road to Power (New York:
MacMillan Publishing, 1982); The think tank in question was the Institute of Pacific Relations,
the editor of which Dulles communicated with on multiple occasions. Letter from Dulles to
Alfred Kohlberg, 7 Dec 1950, Box 48, John Foster Dulles: Selected Correspondence 1891-1960,
RSBC, Princeton Library.
3
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ostensibly clinical calculation of power. In other words, it is not just the actors—the analysts and
the visiting ambassadors and the generals in their windowless planning rooms—who generated a
historical outcome. The environment in which they worked, lived, and exhaled into, inevitably
shaped the world around them and the world that they envisioned for the future.
What follows is not a biographical study of John Foster Dulles. It is, rather, a study of the
world of decision-making that Dulles inhabited during his years of activity in the Truman
administration. In doing so, it directly reflects on the why of certain decisions leading to the 1951
San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan, and how this affected newly-independent states like the
Republic of Korea (ROK). The United States may have possessed what Melvyn Leffler
described as a “preponderance of power” in the world after WWII,4 but American grand strategy
was inadequate to cope with lingering questions of reconciliation and redress in the Asia-Pacific.
In particular, the exclusion of the ROK from the San Francisco Peace Treaty and American
defense plans have propelled this study. How American diplomats grappled with Korean issues
exposed the striking transformation of the peace treaty from a postcolonial, postwar document
into a Cold War device. The global priorities of the State Department had little room for
lingering Korean concerns, which American diplomats labeled as obstructionist, unnecessary,
and unimportant. The advent of the Cold War may have ushered in a new era of superpower
rivalry, but it also permitted the United States to prematurely terminate any responsibility of
moderating a conversation on Japan’s imperialist history. The legacy of that imperialism has
persisted and continues to limit the extent of international cooperation that can be achieved in
East Asia.

4

Leffler, Melvyn. A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman
Administration, and the Cold War. (Stanford University Press, 1993).
3
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There was more to the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty than meets the eye. It of course
restored Japanese sovereignty and put a formal termination to World War II in Asia. But the
treaty regime also signaled the beginning of American structural dominance in the Asia-Pacific.
This was symbolized by the way American diplomats handled treaty issues and actualized by the
bilateral security agreements that the U.S. concluded alongside the peace treaty. While the peace
treaty was the outward face of freshly-minted American grand strategy, it nevertheless
emphatically failed to live up to its advertised purposes. The exclusion of the ROK from the
peace treaty process along with the story behind the aborted attempt to create a NATO in Asia,
under the title of a “Pacific Pact,” are the two central issues that motivate and guide this
investigation. Both affairs were the result of a dramatic shift in American foreign policy from
encouraging multilateral cooperation and regional integration to the need for short-term tactical
flexibility, even at the cost of resolving residual wartime disputes.
The exclusion of Korea highlights how American diplomats failed to reconcile the
competing threads of addressing Japan’s wartime past and colonial legacies in Korea with
America’s strategic priorities. The narrative of the Pacific Pact explores how State Department
officials generally viewed Asia as a frontier fraught with uncertainty, and how they shied away
from attempting to create a capacious framework for Asian security—the lack of structure, and
constraints, on American policy would go on to become the defining feature of future American
grand strategy in Asia. In a post-Cold War era, this foundation that originated in 1951 would in
turn become an obstruction as American policymakers sought ways to bind South Korea and
Japan closer together, only to encounter simmering feuds between the two nations.5
5

Lee, Chung Min. Prospects for US-South Korean-Japanese Trilateral Security
Cooperation in an Era of Unprecedented Threats and Evolving Political Forces. The Atlantic
Council, Dec 2018; “U.S. Lawmakers Tout U.S.-Japan-South Korea Alliance as Seoul, Tokyo
Feud.” Reuters. 12 Feb 2019.
4
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This research builds on past scholarship regarding Korean exclusion and the Pacific Pact.
South Korea did not officially sign the peace treaty with Japan, ostensibly because of American
insistence that the ROK was not an allied power. Some analysts, like the historian Seong-hwa
Cheong, argue that South Korea was not a signatory primarily due to American fear of Soviet
objections and British dislike for Korean President Syngman Rhee. In contrast, social and
cultural historians like John Price argue that American and Japanese racism and Dulles’ dim
view of Korean capacities led to the ROK’s exclusion.6 While the first view ignores the
predominant role that the U.S. played as essentially the sole gatekeeper to the peace treaty, the
second credits Dulles with too much power. At the time of the treaty negotiations, Dulles was not
Secretary of State but instead a special ambassador, appointed by then-President Truman and his
Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, to execute the treaty negotiations. Dulles had authority over
treaty negotiation, but that authority stemmed from the approval of the State Department and the
vast array of earlier plans that diplomats at the State Department bequeathed to Dulles.
This study takes a different approach. It focuses on analyzing how the evolution of
American perception of Korean issues reflected the competing strains of thought within the
American government, from genuine interest in multilateralism to security-oriented realpolitik.
Longstanding cultural attitudes and ignorance set the stage for continuing American disinterest in
Korean attempts to achieve moral redress for Korea’s colonial past. Korean exclusion was sealed
by departmental concerns about upsetting a careful timeline that prioritized the restoration of

6

Cheong, Sung-hwa. The Politics of Anti-Japanese Sentiment in Korea: Japanese-South
Korean Relations under American Occupation, 1945-1952. (New York: Greenwood Press,
1991); Price, John. 'Orienting' Canada: Race, Empire and the Transpacific (Vancouver, UBC
Press, 2011).
5
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Japanese sovereignty. The need for a Cold War grand strategy decisively eliminated the
possibility for a conversation on colonial and wartime questions.
Similarly, historians and international relations scholars have examined the Pacific Pact
and the broader reasons for why there is no NATO-like alliance in Asia. Realist theories have
argued that the U.S. intended to maximize its advantage over its varying Asian partners. Victor
Cha has exemplified this approach, under his “powerplay” theory. David Mahon, instead, argues
that the United States acquiesced to the objections of its other partners in the Asia-Pacific, who
could not abide by a multilateral alliance that would also include a “rehabilitated” Japan.
Constructivist scholars like Peter Katzenstein and Christopher Hemmer have instead emphasized
the lack of cultural affinity stretching across the Pacific and garden-variety racism among white
Americans for the lack of interest in a robust collective defense organization in Asia.7
This thesis builds on this work by arguing that the State Department viewed
multilateralism, and a would-be Pacific Pact, as a means to an end. A rapidly changing
geopolitical landscape compounded by the respective frangibility of potential partners
incentivized American planners and diplomats to respond to and develop proposals on short
notice, often choosing the path of least resistance. Within the State Department, the pact was
solely a satisficing tool to ensure the passage of a peace treaty. The stunted nature of the pact
proposal resulted in a short shelf life, as Americans turned away from the difficulty of addressing
internal Asian concerns which would have been necessary via a multilateral alliance. For

Cha, Victor. “The Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia.” International Security,
Vol 34, no. 3, (Winter 2009/2010): 158-196; Mabon, David. “Elusive Agreements: The Pacific
Pact Proposals of 1949-1951.” Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 57, no.2, (May 1988): 147-177;
Hemmer, Christopher and Peter J. Katzenstein. “Why Is There No NATO in Asia? Collective
Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism.” International Organizations, Vol. 56,
no. 3 (Summer 2002): 575-607.
7
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American policymakers, Asia was an uncertain, unstable frontier. Rather than expend energy
normalizing relations between Asian nations and Japan, the United States relied on bilateral
alliances to secure its immediate security goals.
Although after World War II the United States had seemingly unlimited leverage over its
partners in the Asia-Pacific region, American diplomats and policymakers failed to resolve the
lingering issues that could reconcile Japan with its neighbors or integrate Korea into a vision for
Asia. Observers at the time also noticed this failing; Marshall Green, an analyst in the office of
Northeast Asian Affairs in the State Department, opined in a memorandum dated from late
October 1949 that there “would seem to be cause for encouraging ties between our two proteges
in Northeast Asia, and cause for doing it now while we retain pretty much of a controlling hand
in the affairs of these two countries.”8 This thesis seeks to answer the same questions to which
Green never received a clear response.
The negotiation of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the attempt at a multilateral
Pacific Pact were two central processes in the American construction of a geopolitical structure
in Asia. Cold War concerns shaped the broad contours of American grand strategy, but American
diplomats still had to confront keen Korean interests in the outcomes of the treaty and the pact.
Despite the spark of multilateralist fervor in the ending days of World War II, American
diplomats ultimately failed to normalize relations between Japan and Korea. In the end,
American diplomats found no way to weave moral reconciliation into the need to secure
American interests in the context of a crystallizing Cold War. The long-standing racialized
assumptions of Korean cultural and political inferiority by American diplomats corresponded
Original document used underline and is replicated here. “Office Memorandum from
Green to Allison.” 29 October 1949, Box 4037, Folder 794.95/1-145 – 12-3149, Central Decimal
Files 1945-1949, RG 59.
8
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with their growing distaste for discussing the legacy of Japanese imperialism in Asia. This
exposed the stark reality that Cold War geopolitics left little room for a multilateralist vision for
the future. By failing to address Korean concerns in the San Francisco Peace Treaty and its
complementary defense structure, the U.S. in turn generated a postwar design for the AsiaPacific guided solely by efforts to maximize American tactical advantages in both diplomatic
and military contexts.
In pursuit of this argument, the thesis is organized into three chapters. Chapter 1 offers
historical context for American ignorance regarding Korea. It then relates that while American
planning slowly germinated and eventually led to the flurry of activity centered around the peace
treaty, Korean issues festered amidst a poorly-managed American occupation of Korea. Chapter
2 focuses on the issue of Korean exclusion from the peace treaty, demonstrating how American
diplomats responded to, analyzed, and addressed (i.e. failed to address) futile Korean efforts to
gain signatory status. The results of the negotiation of the peace treaty led to the creation of the
“San Francisco System” of alliances in Asia. Chapter 3 specifically investigates the evolution of
American security designs, analyzing why Korea never featured in American collective security
plans, and the eventual American decision to only pursue the establishment of bilateral alliances
in Asia.
By September 1951, the United States had assembled the bones for its foreign policy for
the next several decades. American bilateral alliances with Asian countries have lasted to the
present day, along with the absence of multilateral alliances that might facilitate intra-Asian
cooperation. Issues that originated from Japan’s imperialist history have continued to plague the
possibility of greater reconciliation across the Sea of Japan. This study takes a new approach by
not labeling any one individual as the sole culprit nor by assuming that Machiavellian

8
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calculations motivated the entirety of American decisions. Instead, it examines the institution of
the State Department across time and how its institutional history of addressing Korean issues
inevitably led to the decision to exclude ROK from the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the
abortive-Pacific Pact. Due to how and why those decisions unfolded in the postwar period, U.S.Asian and intra-Asian relations have remained shackled by the undiscussed casualties of the past.

9
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Chapter 1
Searching between the Margins: U.S. Postwar and Occupation Policy

The December 5, 1943 Sunday edition of the The Boston Globe presents a snapshot of
news reporting amid an unfolding global conflict. The headline news, an update on the rolling
American offensive powering towards Rome, dominates much of the front page, as do other
reports of Allied air offensives, bloody fighting on the Pacific island of Tarawa, and the combat
death of a former boxing champion-turned enlisted soldier.9 Nestled beneath the photo of
Madame Chiang Kai-shek wearing a fashionable hat while visiting Egypt is a blurb of an article
that discusses the issue of Korean independence after a prospective Japanese defeat.
The article was ostensibly intended to explain the context of the December 1, 1943 Cairo
Declaration between President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi), where the three leaders agreed to share the
responsibility of preparing Korea for political independence. But much of the article serves to
acquaint the reader with what and where Korea is. “It is larger than England, Scotland, and
Wales combined, and has a population as big as Spain’s…” Much of the article reads like a
concise encyclopedic entry, with a brief background section that characterizes the erstwhile
peninsular kingdom as isolated and never having modernized prior to annexation by Japan. It
ends by labeling Koreans as unwilling subjects of Japan and, thus, not an enemy people. The

Hartman, Carl. “Giving Korea Her Independence May Be a Ticklish Job.” Daily Boston
Globe, 5 December 1943.
9
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article characterizes Korea as a passive agent, subject to the whims of Japanese control and
Allied post-war plans, respectively.
The author of the article, Carl Hartman, was a D.C.-based journalist focused on Capitol
Hill and was no one’s idea of a Korea expert.10 The emphasis on historical context in pursuit of
understanding the Cairo Declaration is reflective of the average reader’s unfamiliarity with
Korea at the time, but also, perhaps, Hartman’s own necessary background research while
reporting on the December 1 agreement. For the American public, for news reporters, and even
American postwar planners, Korea required an introduction.
The content of The Globe’s Korea article is reflective of Korea’s submerged position in
the American public view prior to 1945. Only Japanese colonial control of Korea afforded the
former “hermit kingdom,” as Hartman labeled it, what attention in mainstream newspapers it did
receive in the 1940s. The absence of a unified Korean government-in-exile that could
convincingly trace itself back to the old ruling monarchy in Korea did not help the cause of
independence. Although specialized non-governmental organizations and isolated American
individuals may have kept themselves abreast of the cause of Korean subjugation, the memories
of Korean independence had grown dimmer in the decades since the time of Japan’s annexation
and the start of World War II. There is an enormous transition from late 1943, when readers of
The Globe might have read about Korea in depth for the first time, to 1950, when thousands of
American soldiers fought to preserve the South Korean state against its northern counterpart.
Korea was not merely an unknown entity to the average American reader; specifics were
lost even on the supposed American experts who struggled to find a place for Korea within their
postwar designs. American rhetoric during the war may have claimed to support Korea in a post10

Hartman also wrote for The Jewish Advocate where he authored a column called
“Capitol Spotlight”, which was a weekly roundup of Capitol Hill news during the war.
11
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colonial transition, as evidenced by the Cairo Declaration, but it masked the utter absence of
detailed plans. As the Soviet Union entered the war against Japan in August 1945, the State-WarNavy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC, pronounced “swink”) attempted to partition Korea into
Soviet and American occupation zones, largely to prevent Soviet expansion in Northeast Asia.
After a late-night drafting session on August 10 and consulting a crude map of Korea, SWNCC
hastily chose the thirty-eighth parallel as the partition line. The Soviet Union promptly accepted
the demarcation, with both countries having the vague understanding that elections would
materialize later and unify the peninsula.11 This ad hoc decision formed the basis for the
militarized border between North and South Korea, and closely resembled the eventual border
that settled between the two nations in 1953.
From 1945 to 1948, the American army officers who found themselves administering
southern Korea muddled their way through with marginal successes. Eventually, the U.S. Army
ended its occupation of Korea, leaving the fragile Syngman Rhee government with a handful of
Army advisors and promises of economic aid. The American withdrawal from Korea was not
made in the interests of geopolitics or grand strategy, but rather for the less elegant reason to
save money, men, and resources from a low priority in a time of defense sequesters and a limited
budget.
In the immediate postwar era, American decision-making marginalized Korean issues.
The long years where there was no unified Korean voice in the international scene from 1905 to
1945 resulted in the general American assumption that Korea was neither strategically or
symbolically important. Unlike other Japanese wartime territorial acquisitions, the former colony
was unique in that the sheer length of time since its independence had obliterated the possibility
11

For a retelling of the drafting session, see Schaller, Michael. The American Occupation
of Japan. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 74-75.
12
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of American liberators “returning” Korea to its rightful leadership—there was no universallyaccepted government-in-exile to whose leadership Korea could be returned. Korea, instead,
blended into the background as being one of many newly-independent, “politically
inexperienced” states. At a time when Korea’s fate depended on American decision-making, the
country remained on the fringes of American interest and concerns. Until the start of the Korean
War, the only avenue through which the ROK could advocate for itself would be in context of
the negotiation of the peace treaty.

I.

“Is it Spelt with a C or a K?”

On November 17, 1905, Korea officially became a Japanese protectorate. The Joseon
dynasty, Korea’s ruling dynastic kingdom since the fourteenth century and traditionally a tribute
state of China, became one of the first victims of Japan’s new imperialist objectives. Japan
asserted both its Great Power ambitions and its status as the most powerful state in East Asia as it
grabbed colonies of its own. Japanese control of Korea was received well among some American
observers. The New York Times, reporting on November 19, ends its dry relaying of events by
stating: “...it is believed that the Korean people will be much better governed in the future [under
Japanese rule].”12 The November 18 edition of the Los Angeles Times even more strongly
reflected the pervasiveness of the belief that Korea was an un-modernized, barbaric nation.
“KOREA BALKS AT HER MEDICINE,” the headline blares. “Dose of civilization from Dr.

“Korean Cabinet Gives In, Accepts Japanese Protectorate After Nine Hours’
Discussion.” The New York Times, 19 Nov 1905.
12
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Japan tastes bad.”13 Clearly, the protestations of the Korean Emperor, haplessly marooned under
Japanese house arrest in Seoul, at the loss of his nation’s sovereignty had little weight among the
editors.
Japan annexed Korea outright in 1910. In a time of new imperialism, where the belief
that Western nations still needed to reluctantly bear the burden of uplifting the uncivilized
corners of the world, most observers generally considered Japan’s annexation in a positive light.
Western writers viewed Korea as an anachronism, a remnant of medieval times, but now in the
orbit of modernizing, progressive Japanese influence. The eleventh edition of the Encyclopedia
Britannica, published in 1911, describes the annexation in the following way: “That [the
annexation] constituted a heavy blow to Korea’s independence could not be gainsaid. That it was
inevitable seemed to be equally obvious. For there existed in Korea nearly all the worst abuses of
medieval systems…” The entry then proceeds to list the barbaric nature of Korean law, military,
government, and society as a justification for the nation’s newfound colonial status.14
Missionaries often had divided opinions in this era, with some supporting Japan’s moves
to reduce the prevalence of Buddhism in Korea, thus opening space for Christian conversion
efforts.15 But others sought to bring the issue of Korean independence to light. Hulbert B.
Homer, a Methodist missionary from Vermont, published several books decrying Japanese
aggression. “The American public has been persistently told that the Korean people are a

13
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degenerate...nation, incapable of better things, intellectually inferior, and better off under
Japanese rule than independent. The following pages may in some measure answer these
charges…”16 Homer writes in The Passing of Korea (originally published in 1906). Later in the
book, Homer censures the discriminatory legal code in Korea. “Japanese look upon the Koreans
as lawful game, and the latter, having no proper tribunals where they can obtain redress, do not
dare to retaliate.”17 Hulbert was a unique figure, motivated by a mixture of Wilsonian idealism
and down-to-earth empathy for the suffering of his fellow man. In the 1950s, the ROK’s attempts
to confront Japan would also be obstructed by the lack of proper tribunals on an international
scale.
However, Korea remained an issue that few talked about. In common with many other
representatives from colonial states, a Korean delegation made its way to the 1919 Paris Peace
Conference but spurred little progress.18 For the next three decades, Korea remained hidden from
Western view, only emerging in news reports of Japanese counterinsurgency operations in
Korea, travel guides, and the occasional call for independence by Korean exiles or a lone
Western sympathizer. One author of a 1930 travel guide, H. B. Drake, lamented Western
ignorance of Korea. “‘Is it spelt with a C or a K?’” Drake recounts a question he was asked
before he set off on his travels. But despite his exultations of Korea’s natural beauties and rich
history, Drake himself repeats the oft-quoted line that Korea’s colonial status is for the best, and
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that Japan “was conscience-bound to extend to her the benefits of modern progress.” His
depiction of the Korean university students whom he mentored during his travels negotiate the
blurred line between adoring and patronizing, labeling them as unhappy with Japan’s authority
but helpless, mindless, and unintelligent enough to think of an alternative.19
Japanese administration of Korea, like many other colonial states, was geared towards
maximizing the flow of assets from the “periphery” (Korea) to the “core” (Japan). Japanese
administrators harnessed Korea’s manpower and natural resources to fuel the empire’s industrial
growth. Bruce Cumings describes Japan’s colonial policy in Korea as “a means of…providing
the wherewithal to mobilize and extract resources on an unprecedented scale.”20 Extraction is an
apt term. In order for Japan to “colonize” a formerly-sovereign nation, Korean culture and
language had to be eliminated. Japanese officials exploited existing class divides that originated
from Korea’s previously Confucian, agricultural society in pursuit of maintaining order. Many
aspiring Koreans faced the unsavory choice of collaborating with the Japanese occupier or
having no opportunities for social or economic advancement. Japan’s totalitarian control of
Korea did spark resistance, both violent and nonviolent, which in turn prompted an even greater
increase in the numbers of colonial police and soldiers who sought to root out opposition to
Japanese rule. Nevertheless, within an Asian racial hierarchy, American writers during Korea’s
colonial period consciously placed Korea beneath Japan. Americans were impressed by Japanese
modernization, innovation, and military prowess, and had few qualms about Japan’s
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administration of Korea. So long as Japanese control was framed by both Japanese and American
observers as uplifting for Koreans, Japanese control had few detractors abroad.

a. A War to Spark American Interest
Korea’s relationship with the United States changed dramatically as American relations
with Japan soured. When the United States entered World War II in December 1941, Korea
gained some renewed prominence; American condemnation of Japanese aggression in turned
transformed Korea into a subjugated land in need of liberation from the Japanese imperialist
yoke. Materially, the U.S. was now generating postwar plans for what would happen to Japanese
holdings after a surrender. Korea was now a region for which the U.S. had to incorporate into its
plans by necessity. Beginning in 1943, the Allied Powers agreed on early plans for Korea to
undergo a period of trusteeship—multilateralist “guidance” that would prepare Koreans for
independence—and culminated in the December 1, 1943 declaration by Roosevelt, Churchill,
and Chiang Kai-shek to support Korean independence “in due course.” Although the trusteeship
scheme in retrospect appears belittling, it was nevertheless motivated in the United States by
concepts that American/Allied tutelage would be benevolent, nobly-minded—and crucially—
distinct from past Japanese or Western imperialism.
The lack of contact or consultation between postwar planners and actual Koreans
severely limited the extent of to which American benevolence could translate to effective policy.
During the war, the State Department took care to avoid contact with advocacy efforts by Korean
exile groups and rejected calls for the U.S. to recognize any one as a government-in-exile. The
Korean Provisional Government (KPG), which the ROK lists as its institutional predecessor, was
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the most internationally-prominent quasi-government-in-exile.21 Founded by independence
activists, the KPG, based in Shanghai, organized assassinations, bombings, and full-on
engagements with Japanese military units. During the war, the KPG organized a small military
detachment, fewer than a thousand soldiers, who served alongside the Kuomintang army in
China. But many of the KPG’s most audacious operations occurred in the early period of
Japanese occupation and had questionable impact beyond establishing an institutional history of
resistance. The KPG was severely limited in terms of its resources which constricted its ability to
“prove” to the State Department that it should receive recognition.
Even as American rhetoric incorporated the call for Korean independence during
the war, the State Department was loath to give recognition to the KPG. It saw the group
as merely an uncredentialed club that survived solely on Chiang Kai-shek’s. On June 5,
1945, the State Department replied to a request by Syngman Rhee, then the KPG’s
“ambassador” to the U.S., for Korea to be represented as an Allied Power at the 1945 San
Francisco Conference. Although previous department replies to KPG lobbying had been
noncommittal, expressing support for the cause of liberation while avoiding comments on
the KPG’s claim to sovereignty, this letter held no such diplomatic reservations:
The United Nations which are represented at the San Francisco Conference all
have legally constituted governing authorities, whereas the “Korean Provisional
Government” and other Korean organizations do not possess the qualifications
requisite for obtaining recognition by the United States as a governing authority.
The “Korean Provisional Government” has never had administrative authority
21
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over any part of Korea nor can it be considered representative of the Korean
people of today. Its following even among exile Koreans is limited.22
No doubt the State Department could compare the characteristics of the KPG to other
governments-in-exile. The Norwegian government-in-exile included Norway’s ruling family
which was evacuated during the German invasion. The Free French forces were set up by
Charles De Gaulle, a general in the French Army and a government minister. The KPG, instead,
was composed of independence activists and Korean nationalists, none of whom had preannexation government credentials or royal blood. Of course, the State Department would have
been hard-pressed to find any Korean exile group that previously “had administrative authority
over any part of Korea,” given that Japanese colonial control was nearing its forty-year
anniversary. But the lack of other options did not confer international recognition to the KPG. It
remained on the fringes, unable to gain entry or an audience with the Allied policy-makers who
conferred about Korea’s future.
Although the State Department’s concerns about the legitimacy of Korean exile groups is
understandable given that no group had a pedigree that traced back to the dynastic governing
authority of Korea, in blocking off contact between itself and exile groups the department also
removed possibilities for consultation with Korean individuals. Deflecting the interests of
Korean exiles, no matter American suspicions, ensured that American postwar planning
approached Korea without regard to the specific history or makeup of Korea’s domestic interests.
As Korea edged closer towards independence, in step with the march of American marines
island-hopping across the Pacific Ocean towards Japan, American ignorance persisted. As a
result, Korea remained a blank canvas in the minds of many American policymakers: a colonized
22
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people in need of independence and introduction to an American-led, free market global system,
but with no distinguishing characteristics that demanded special attention. In the future, as
American diplomats labored to build a comprehensive defensive/diplomatic architecture for
American involvement in Asia, they would have to contend with the harsh truth that Koreans
themselves thought of Korean issues with the utmost importance.

II.

The Road to 1950

With the collapse of Japan’s empire, the United States took on the responsibility of
occupying and administering the portion of Korea south of the thirty-eighth parallel. The
insulated nature of American decision-making regarding Korea during the war also carried over
into postwar decisions. Decisions relating to the U.S. Occupation of Japan had stemmed from
years of preparation, planning, and discussion between the various bureaucratic agents in the
U.S. Stemming from necessary wartime preoccupation with Japanese questions, issues like the
status of the Japanese Emperor and the extent to which the Imperial Japanese government
officials would be relied upon while administering the nation were subjected to a series of
conversations that weighed the pros and cons over time. In the end, General MacArthur was
appointed to lead the American occupation authority, the Supreme Commander of the Allied
Powers (SCAP), that would work through the existing Japanese bureaucracy in administering the
occupation, at the very least promoting an image of cooperation rather than overlordship.
In contrast, the War Department designated General John R. Hodge and his unit, the
XXIV Corps, to occupy Korea on August 15, just one day after Japan’s surrender. Hodge,
characterized by one historian as a “combat officer with few political skills” had no preparation
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for his newfound role as civil administrator, and the War Department settled on Hodge largely
because the XXIV Corps was the closest Army unit that could be rapidly deployed to Korea in
the event of a collapse of Japan’s colonial structure.23 Hodge arrived in Seoul at the head of a
new authority for southern Korea, the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK),
with little understanding of the issues that he would soon have to face.
Much has been written about the often-short-sighted decisions made during USAMGIK’s
tenure in Korea. Hodge had little sympathy or patience for Korean issues, in part stemming from
his belief in Korean ethnic and mental inferiority. One colorful telegram sent from General
Hodge to MacArthur, a few months after the start of the American occupation, cited Hodge’s
frustration that he was forced to deal with “poorly trained, and poorly educated Orientals
strongly affected by 40 years of Jap control, who stubbornly and fanatically hold on to what they
like and dislike,…and with whom it is almost impossible to reason.”24 USAMGIK continued to
employ Japanese bureaucrats during the early period of the occupation, and promoted
reactionary policies that undercut the legitimacy of the future ROK government that it sought to
inaugurate. USAMGIK also supported Syngman Rhee, far from the most popular figure among
southern Koreans, largely because occupation officials saw the English-speaking conservative as
the best choice to prevent instability or, even worse, the election of a communist sympathizer. 25
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With little support or assistance from other agencies in the Truman administration, the U.S.
occupation was a confused process of attempting to maintain political and economic stability
while searching for an acceptable figure to whom the responsibility of managing the nation could
be thrust.
As the American occupation came to a close, American material support for the newlyminted ROK government dwindled. One of the few instances of American support for ROK
issues on an international scale came in December 1948, when the ROK achieved UN
recognition in the form of observer status with the help of John Foster Dulles, who was acting as
an advisor to the American delegation to the UN at the time.26 But American support in the UN
did not translate to broader support for Rhee’s government. The Department of the Army was
eager to withdraw from Korea. The initial date for USAMGIK’s withdrawal was September 15,
1948, which the Army reluctantly agreed to delay until March 1949 due to disagreements with
the State Department about the ROK’s stability.27 Rhee’s 50,000-man military was far from
equal to the strength of the burgeoning North Korean army. But in 1948, the Truman
administration only asked for $10 billion in defense spending, which would require a 13 percent
reduction in military personnel across the services.28 The requirements of an American
26

The efforts of the ROK to obtain representation in the UN is recounted in the following
interview with Dr. John Chang Myun, who was a Korean diplomat and later briefly served as
Prime Minister during the 1960 democracy movement. Chang, Myun (1899-1966) – Prime
Minister of Korea, 1964, JFD Oral History Collection, 1-6.
27

Letter from Kenneth Royall, Secretary of the Army, to Dean Acheson, Secretary of
State, 23 Jun 1948, Box 1, Niles Bond Papers, Harry S. Truman Library Archives, Independence,
Missouri; “Memorandum of Conversation between Butterworth and Secretary Acheson,” 5
March 1948, Box 1, Folder “1-2: Document 1-9: Sept 1947 – July 1948”, Niles Bond Papers,
Truman Library.
28

Leffler, 223.

22

Jin 23
occupation in Korea drained on Army resources at a time when there was a domestic pressure to
balance the budget.
After the American withdrawal, Korea did feature in some nascent economic revival
plans in the State Department but remained outside the clear boundaries that designated strong
American interests. Newly-minted Secretary of State Dean Acheson, aware of Korea’s historical
role as Japan’s chief source of rice and agricultural surpluses, had some interest in sending aid to
Korea in order to indirectly support Japan’s economic recovery.29 However, the lack of
congressional interest in another foreign aid bill, particularly to what seemed a corner of
nowhere, sank Acheson’s proposal. Korean issues returned to its pre-war position at the
periphery of American attention.
In April 1950, less than two months prior to the start of the Korean War, only eleven
Foreign Service Officers and a handful of support staffers served in the American embassy in
Seoul. For a point of comparison, in 2011 over two hundred American Foreign Service Officers
and four hundred other staff members were listed on payroll at the U.S. Embassy in South
Korea.30 The small contingent of American diplomats were heavily overworked, to the point that
almost no employee in the embassy was allowed to take local leave due to the workload and
staffing shortage.31 The tiny size of the embassy demonstrates the low level of attention the State
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Department assigned towards events in Korea prior to the start of the Korean War, and Korea’s
minimal level of gravity as a State Department responsibility.
Yet the start of the Korean War as well as the commencement of concrete moves towards
a peace treaty with Japan ensured that the ROK would surge to the forefront of American
concerns. Materially, the State Department would begin paying much closer attention to
telegrams sent from the U.S. Ambassador to Korea. Korea, once a “backwater” deployment, was
the new focus of men, materiel, and diplomatic activity. Ironically, the ROK government’s nearcollapse in the early months of the war also gave it a more prominent position from which to
advocate. Additionally, the concrete moves towards the conclusion of a peace treaty began
nearly simultaneously with the start of the Korean War, adding urgency to American diplomatic
efforts. With the peace treaty and the American need to generate a new grand strategy for the
Asia-Pacific, dusty issues of Korea’s place in America’s postwar vision reemerged. The question
of how to resolve the residual issues from the legacy of Japanese imperialism entered stage left.
With it, came the spotlight that would also illuminate Korea’s attempt to gain both moral redress
and a place in America’s postwar plans.
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Chapter 2
Shutting the Lid to Pandora’s Box: Korea’s Status in the Peace Treaty

I.

San Francisco’s Muddled Legacy

On September 8, 1951, delegations from forty-eight nations gathered in the opulent San
Francisco opera house and signed a peace treaty which would formally end the war between the
victorious Allied Powers and Japan. Although the Soviet Union walked out in the middle of the
conference, the treaty nevertheless formally signaled the restoration of Japanese sovereignty.
“The Japan of today is no longer the Japan of yesterday,” Yoshida Shigeru, the Japanese Prime
Minister, said before the assembled delegates. “We will not fail your expectations of us as a new
nation, dedicated to peace, democracy and freedom.”32 The peace treaty was a coup for the
Truman administration, which had authorized John Foster Dulles to lead the U.S. treaty
negotiating team in June 1950. The treaty reduced Japan’s territories to its home islands and
authorized the seizure of overseas Japanese assets, but—unlike the discredited 1919 Treaty of
Versailles—largely refrained from punitive reparations and further restrictions on sovereignty.
In a nonbinding clause, Japan pledged to “refrain” from the “use of force” in international
disputes going forward. Another article encouraged affected nations seeking reparations to
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initiate their own negotiations with the Japanese government.33 When a group of Japanese
businessmen visited Nebraska in early 1952, they expressed amazement with their American
host that San Francisco was not at all “the treaty of a conqueror.”34 The U.S. would be capping
off six years of a generally successful occupation of Japan, just in time for the United States to
repeatedly petition its former wartime foe to rearm in the face of Soviet machinations in East
Asia.
Yet for all the reasons why the treaty was initially praised for its leniency, the San
Francisco peace is perforated by its controversial legacy. The enduring hostilities of the Cold
War, embodied by the Soviet walkout, permeated the conference and its attendant news
coverage. The September 8, 1951 issue of The New York Times noted uneasily that San
Francisco may have “reconciled” Japan with the Western Allies, but it was “not quite a peace of
reconciliation from the point of view of the great powers.”35 Additionally, with a war still raging
on the Korean peninsula—separated from Japan by a strait measuring only 120 miles wide—
American military planners were anxious to ensure that the prosecution of the war would not be
interrupted by the resumption of Japanese sovereignty. Consequently, a security treaty between
Japan and the United States was signed on the same day as the peace treaty, granting the U.S.
exclusive rights to maintain bases and military forces in Japan.36 Japan’s sovereignty was
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returned with a bright red asterisk, asserting its subordination to American security interests in
Asia.
The San Francisco Peace Treaty initiated a new political-economic order that not only
defined relations between Japan and the United States, but also America’s place in the AsiaPacific. International relations scholar Kent Calder popularized the term “San Francisco System”
to describe this new Pacific order; an order marked by American dominance of geopolitical
matters and continuing unwillingness, or a recurring inability, among nations in the Asia-Pacific
to reconcile with Japan over unaddressed aspects of Japanese wartime imperialism.37 One such
aspect of San Francisco’s troubled legacy was the absence of the Republic of Korea (ROK) from
the treaty conference, having been denied an invitation despite repeated attempts to seek
signatory status. The San Francisco Peace Treaty was billed as both a backwards and forwardsfacing instrument that could restore Japanese sovereignty and bookend World War II in the
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Pacific. Korean exclusion raises questions over how effectively the treaty could fulfill either of
these goals and satisfy lingering wartime animosities.
The ROK was not an Allied Power, as it was not a UN-recognized state until 1948 and
the KPG never received recognition during World War II. This lack of credentials was the oftquoted reason for Korean exclusion by American diplomats at the time. In July 1951, Dulles,
acting as a special representative of the State Department, informed the stunned Korean
ambassador Yang You-Chan that the ROK would not be a treaty signatory. Dulles offered the
reasoning that only those nations which were participants of the 1942 UN Declaration would
sign a treaty of peace with Japan.38 In other words, the ROK was not an “official” Allied Power
and could not be a signatory, regardless of Korea’s moral claim to victimhood at the hands of
Japanese imperialism. However, John Price notes that this reason was flimsy at best, not least
because the newly-independent nations of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos would all attend and
sign the treaty despite having been part of the French colony of Indochina until after the end of
World War II.39 The peace treaty, which supposedly signaled Japan’s rehabilitation in the eyes of
the world, did a remarkable job of eschewing a key victim who would have benefited from “a
peace of reconciliation” with Japan.
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Yet to label the ROK’s relation with the San Francisco Peace Treaty as a “complete
exclusion” would be a misnomer. Article 21 included treaty provisions whereby Japan officially
renounced its claims to Korea and assented to Korean appropriation of Japanese properties left
on the peninsula. Through the treaty, Japan promised to adopt favorable maritime, fishing, and
trading relations with the ROK. Dulles summarized Korea’s relationship with the treaty in a
report for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: “[T]he treaty, in many ways, treats Korea
like an Allied Power.”40 Significantly, however, the ROK was not included in particular treaty
provisions, including clauses that encouraged Japan to negotiate reparations with former
enemies. The participation of Indochinese states and the ROK having access to some, but not all,
benefits of the treaty underlines the point that the ROK was clearly not denied a place at the table
because of its colonial status during World War II. This raises the question: in the minds of
American policy-makers, what could possibly have informed the criteria that determined
inclusion or exclusion in the peace treaty?
The remainder of this chapter argues that, in American eyes, any concerns related to
satisfying post-war moral claims of victimhood were decisively eclipsed by U.S. grand strategic
interests. The obstacle to Korea’s inclusion as a treaty signatory was not because of its lack of
independent sovereign status during World War II. Korea was excluded because from the time
when American post-war planners began drafting a peace treaty to when the peace treaty was
signed in September 1951, American interests in the Asia-Pacific had become reified along
newfound, Cold War lines. American decisions were informed by cultural assumptions about
Koreans and justified by heightened Cold War tensions wherein the enemy was a monolithic
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Communist threat of apocalyptic proportions. Fundamentally, Korean inclusion in the San
Francisco Peace Treaty would have involved confronting the fundamental tension between
American postwar grand strategy and past World War II idealism for a just peace.
In this way, Korea’s tragic history under Japanese control simultaneously gave it the
greatest reason to seek access to the peace treaty negotiations and doomed its self-advocacy from
the start. With the Korean War still raging and a unilateral grand strategy crystallizing, American
diplomats and policy-makers would prioritize expediency above all else.

II.

“The Situation in the West Pacific Will be Grave for a Long Time”

The San Francisco Peace Treaty was an American-led enterprise. Early U.S. diplomatic
efforts had involved negotiating through the Far Eastern Commission (FEC)—a body of former
Allied Powers designed to collaborate on postwar issues. However, these efforts ultimately failed
in 1947 as the Chinese Civil War produced two separate “Chinas,” poisoning U.S.-Soviet
cooperation on the commission. Thereafter, the State Department drafted plans based on the
assumption of American domination of treaty negotiations—an assumption to an extent justified
by American perception of their outsized role in the Pacific theater. To this end, John Foster
Dulles, as head of the U.S. negotiating team, traveled to the nations which would sign the treaty
and negotiated with each government individually, essentially crafting a multilateral document
out of a series of bilateral conversations. John Allison, a career State official who served
prominently on Dulles’ team, wrote after the fact that Dulles’ strategy was designed to avoid
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Soviet obstructionism.41 It should be noted that deploying bilateral means for a multilateral end
also would have enabled Dulles to maximize American leverage, as a dyadic interaction limited
the chances for smaller powers to cooperate with one another against the United States.42
It was this context that enabled the United States to act as the primary gatekeeper for
potential signatories to the treaty, although State Department officials remained cognizant of the
interests of other major powers such as Great Britain and the Soviet Union.43 Even before the de
facto collapse of the Far Eastern Commission in late 1947, a State Department working group
produced a treaty draft earlier that year that included had Korea, along with Indonesia, as
signatories despite neither being Allied powers. An accompanying commentary justified
Indonesian inclusion on the basis of its significant “human and material losses” and its status as a
colony of an Allied Power during the war. In contrast, Korean inclusion was justified by noting
that “as a liberated territory with a decades old resistance movement…and with an important
interest in the treaty, [the ROK government] would doubtless feel entitled to participate, and
would be resentful if the U.S. did not favor its participation.”44 The commentary’s language is
compelling. Indonesia was included merely because of its “losses” during the war and its status
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as an allied colony. The motivation to include Korea, however, stemmed from the belief that the
ROK would be resentful if excluded. Although the commentary does include Korea, it
significantly believed that appeasing the “entitled” attitude of the ROK government was equally,
if not more important than any moral standpoint that Korean wartime sacrifice or suffering under
Japanese rule had earned the ROK a place at the table.
The depiction of Korean interests as perhaps-underserved “entitlement” harmonized with
other existing American generalizations about Korea. American military occupation authorities
in Korea had tended to cooperate with prevailing Japanese colonial bureaucrats in part because
they generally viewed the Japanese as competent, experienced administrators and Koreans as
obstreperous, obnoxiously nationalistic, and politically immature.45 The Rhee government was
similarly plagued by the image that their diplomats were nationalistic, to the point of
overstepping the boundaries of the norms of diplomatic behavior. A report dated October 29,
1949 from a Japan-based State Department official advised against encouraging KoreanJapanese cooperation, citing the Korean ambassador’s “repeated and somewhat-aggressive
attempts to deal directly with Japanese officials” as evidence that the ROK was only interested in
extractive bargaining rather than rapprochement.46 Multilateral negotiating with Korea and
Japan, then, was out of the question. Even before the start of the Korean War, the State
Department viewed the ROK government as prone to damaging careful American designs and
motivated by inappropriate levels of undisciplined nationalism. Consequently in the American
view, a Korean delegation could only be involved in the treaty negotiating process on a
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“consultative basis” as the ROK’s exclusion risked causing a troublesome outcry from Seoul and
the Korean public.47 Korean attachment to the peace treaty issue ensured that American
diplomats would at least make a performance of hearing out Korean concerns, but without any
expectation of taking those views into account.

a. New Strategies
However, by 1950-51 geopolitical developments and the intensification of Cold War
tensions had changed the American calculus. In particular, American treaty planning for Japan
evolved from a desire to prevent a vengeful resurgence of Japanese militarism (a la postVersailles Germany) into a need to establish a friendly and strategically-additive nation to the
American defense perimeter in the Pacific. American occupation authorities were certainly
already perturbed by the possibility of anti-Americanism developing in Japan after either a
prolonged occupation or a punitive peace treaty, but the ideological bent of avoiding historical
mistakes slotted nicely into geopolitical concerns of checking the rise of Communism in Asia
and in Japan.48
Japan was a key element of the Truman administration’s policy of containment in Asia.49
“[T]he basic U.S. military objective in Japan,” so summarized a State Department assessment of
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the merits of a peace treaty, “[is] to ensure that in the event of a U.S.-USSR conflict, Japan is ‘on
our side’ with its resources available to us and denied to the Soviets.”50 To that end, the United
States had to fend off internal Communist “subversion”, ensure that Japan reemerged onto the
world stage on the side of the West, prevent the growth of anti-American sentiment, and
optimize American control over Japanese policy.
A proper and speedy peace treaty, supplemented by a security agreement, could
comfortably accomplish those goals and serve the foundation of a new and comprehensive
American defense strategy in Asia. Waiting too long, American occupation and treaty planners
both feared, could prove catastrophic if a Japanese communist movement were augmented by
general Japanese resentment of a prolonged occupation. Rearming Japan, or otherwise building
up Japan economically and politically to be a reliable strategic bulwark in Asia, was already an
American priority in early 1950; these fears were only amplified with the North Korean invasion
of the South in June.51
An atmosphere of contingency pervaded the air in Washington. The sense of urgency is
perhaps best expressed by a March 18, 1951 letter from Dulles to General MacArthur, which
Dulles had penned before he entered another round of treaty negotiations: “The United States
and Japan are the only significant sources of power in the Pacific, we actual, they potential...If
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the United States and Japan fall apart, the situation in the West Pacific will be grave for a long
time.”52 The U.S. was now evaluating treaty issues through the far more immediate lens of its
own imminent security concerns, which would directly affect the question of Korean
participation.

III.

Pandora’s Box and the Korean Case

In some respects, American consideration of satellite issues tethered to the peace treaty
was only slightly altered by the heightening Cold War. The nature of a peace treaty with Japan
would not only determine Japan’s future, but also shape the American—and by extension, the
free world’s—image in Asia. In a manner that resembled old Rooseveltian ideals of equality and
cooperation among sovereign nations, State Department planners were anxious that a peace
treaty avoided the image of amounting to little more than just another Western imperialist
imposition.
As noted, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos ultimately signed the peace treaty. State
Department reasoning for Indochinese participation was suggestive of American concerns about
the makeup of the signatory states. On August 20, 1951, less than three weeks before the San
Francisco Conference was slated to commence, Secretary of State Dean Acheson received a
memorandum, issued under Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk’s name, advocating for the
inclusion of the three newly-independent Indochinese states. Previously, invitations had been
delayed over concerns that India, Indonesia, and Burma—all non-aligned states that the U.S. had
been desperately hoping to include in the peace—might themselves refuse to participate in
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protest if “French puppets” were allowed in. However, the memorandum referenced new reports
that the three non-aligned states might not participate in the treaty-signing regardless. In view of
the fact “that in the last analysis India, Indonesia and Burma may refuse to sign the Treaty and as
it is believed important for as many Asiatic States as possible to sign,” the memorandum
concluded, “it is considered advisable to issue an invitation to the Associated States as soon as
possible.”53 The U.S. accordingly invited Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, which then attended as
treaty signatories. India and Burma refused their invitations, although Indonesia still participated.
Rusk’s August 20 memorandum reveals that it was considered vitally important for
American interests that “as many Asiatic states as possible” participated in the treaty-signing.
His language shows how the State Department was invested in presenting the peace treaty as a
joint document authored by Western and Asian states. It demonstrates that U.S. planners were
doubtlessly conscious of the history of Western involvement in Asia. Earlier that year, the Far
East Division of the State Department argued that Asian historical memory of European
colonialism demanded the exclusion of some European allies from any potential security pact in
Asia. “For example, the participation of the United Kingdom might imply a commitment
regarding Hong Kong that the United States is not prepared to assume,” the memo stated, also
suggesting American wariness about involvement on mainland Asia. “[UK involvement in an
Asian security pact] might also lead to the desire of France or the Netherlands to participate
which would give the arrangement a “colonial” character of unfortunate effect in Asia.”54
Concerns about a “colonial” security pact would have translated to concerns regarding the
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motivations of the peace treaty. The State Department clearly wished to avoid the appearance of
an imposition of Western interests onto Asia. U.S. involvement in Asia needed to be distinct
from European imperialism and to avoid the accompanying negative colonialist implications.
The same concerns applied to American interests related to the peace treaty. In July, a
political advisor for SCAP in Japan sent a telegram to Secretary Acheson, urging that the
Americans avoid any behavior during the conference that might be perceived as belittling or
discriminatory against the Japanese: “We [should] also constantly bear in mind that Japan is an
Asiatic nation and that eyes of Asia will be upon San Francisco and upon [the] manner in which
each and every Asiatic nation, including Japan, is [received] and treated by [the] United States
and other ‘white’ nations.”55 In other words, there could be no characteristically “colonial”
behavior during the conference proceedings. Having many “non-white Asian” nations signing a
peace treaty with Japan could plausibly promote the image that this treaty was the product of a
collective, global effort rather than just American power and interests. Additionally, reinstating
Japan as a member of the Asian community would also require the “approval” of other Asian
nations.
“Asianizing” the treaty by increasing non-Western representation, however, raised
additional questions about the role of the ROK. A Korean delegation might have been wellsuited for the conference. For a Western audience, Korea was visibly an “Asiatic” and alien
nation. In the broadest possible terms, Korea could serve the racialized role of another token
foreigner that might legitimize the American-led peace treaty by simply being present in the
conference hall. Its approval of Japan’s reinstatement would, crucially, be approval coming from
an Asian country. Less cynically, Korean participation could fulfill the Rooseveltian vision of
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transforming the independence movements of oppressed peoples into sovereign nation-states,
each at least nominally equal to one another in terms of certain legal and institutional criteria.
The peace treaty could have contributed an ember to the wider hearth-fire of what Elizabeth
Borgwardt described as “America’s multilateralist moment” during the waning days of the final
Roosevelt administration, where the U.S. labored to ensure that the weak had at least a voice on
the international stage.56
But while maximizing Asian representation at the peace conference was beneficial in
public relations terms, such “Asianization” could not come at the cost of security priorities.
Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos were ideal signatories: they were visibly Asian and had
comparatively little stake in the provisions of the peace treaty, thus posing no obstructions to
American security designs that were linked to the treaty. Korea may have been an Asiatic state,
but it was most certainly deeply interested in a treaty with Japan and vocal about its concerns.
The transformation of American priorities and the ensuing mismatch with the ROK’s attempt to
find moral redress for its colonial history serves to illuminate why Korea would not be at the
table for a treaty purporting to turn a new leaf in relations between the West and Asia.

a. Moral Redress
Reparations, or the lack thereof, was an essential element of the negotiations leading up
to the peace treaty. Even with the historical lesson of Versailles hanging over the postwar world
in East Asia, forcing Japan to pay an indemnity for its wartime behavior would have likely been
welcomed by many countries. The Potsdam Declaration, the document promulgated by the
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Allied Powers that outlined the terms of Japan’s unconditional surrender in July 1945, explicitly
mentioned reparations as a strong possibility for what the Japanese could expect.57 Regardless of
the non-punitive inclinations of the Roosevelt-era State Department, immediate postwar drafts on
reparations policy still made room for Japanese “compensation” for war damages to Allied
countries and personnel. The ensuing debate about reparations and the role of Korea as a
potential claimant reveals much about the transformation of American considerations regarding
the peace treaty and deeper-held feelings about Korea generally.
Even though the United States had shelved the Morgenthau Plan for postwar Germany—
a draconian plan that would have eliminated Germany’s industrial capacity—similar
deliberations persisted with Japan, framed by the notion that Japan should pay for its wartime
behavior both through the pain of defeat and direct reparations. In October 1945, an American
policy planning team led by businessman Edwin Pauley espoused an early draft of American
policy with regard to the question of reparations. While retribution would not be the aim of
American occupation, reparations in the form of industrial equipment should be delivered to
other Asian economics devastated by the war, thus achieving the dual purpose of limiting
Japan’s war-making capacity and restoring regional economic stability.58 In practice, Pauley’s
plans would have essentially amounted to a “pastoralization” of Japan, given the sheer level of
industrial transfers that he recommended. Nevertheless, these postwar policy documents indicate
that strategic and moral reasons for Japanese reparations were not mutually exclusive at first.
State Department planners viewed the postwar devastation in Asia with anxiety. With no
Marshall Plan for Asia or for Europe yet in the books, one of the most direct ways to rebuild the
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economies of the Asia-Pacific was through transfers of Japanese resources in the form of
reparations. Korea, facing acute economic turbulence in the aftermath of Japanese colonial
control, would have been an obvious potential recipient.
American policymakers did not ignore Korea during the early phase of reparations
planning in 1945 and 1946. A December 8, 1945 letter from Pauley to General MacArthur and
SCAP mentions Pauley’s recommendations to President Truman that Japanese industrial plants
and equipment in the home islands “formally used to exploit Korea, could be usefully transferred
from Japan to Korea.”59 Although the fraught nature of the U.S. Occupation of Japan and Japan’s
fragile postwar stability forestalled Pauley’s recommendations, it is significant that Korea held a
place in America’s reparations plans in late 1945. On February 28, 1946, a telegram from
Secretary of State James Brynes stated that the United States and the Far Eastern Commission
had decided that Japanese assets left in Allied countries would be eventually distributed in the
form of reparations. Brynes explicitly mentions Korea, stating that Japanese assets would be held
“in trust” by the American occupation authorities and eventually turned over to a native
government “as recognition of Korean suffering at the hands of the [Japanese government].”60
Despite the fact that there were few to no Korea experts in the State Department, planners still
lumped Korea in with other nations designated “victims” of Japanese control.
In a time concurrent with the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials and a global zeitgeist that
victims of militarized aggression should receive redress, it is not surprising that Korea’s history
alone—without any formal lobbying from an internationally-recognized Korean government—
allowed it to have a powerful moral stature in the eyes of American planners. The technicalities
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of the absence of a U.S.-recognized Korean government-in-exile had little bearing on these early
postwar documents.
In the immediate months after the end of the war, American pronouncements indicated no
qualms about Korean eligibility for compensation. Yet, by late 1949, the State Department’s
policy had crystallized in complete opposition to Japanese reparations to Korea. In addition,
many of the documents by State Department officials arguing against Korean inclusion in the
peace treaty (and access to Japanese reparations) repeatedly mentioned that the Korean
Provisional Government, Korea’s government-in-exile, had never been recognized by the United
States during the war, which would remove grounds for Korean status as an Allied Power. What
could account for this change in attitude?
Early American pronouncements about the moral validity of Korean suffering at the
hands of Japanese aggression may have aligned with American rhetoric at the time, but they
failed to address more incisive questions about wartime reparations, their practicality, and
American willingness to address the full scope of Japanese imperialism in Asia. As a result,
empty American rhetoric was porous enough to allow room for changing strategic values and
priorities to entirely change early plans and beliefs about Korea’s place in the postwar order.
Ultimately, the turn away from reparations had its supporters even among idealistic State
Department diplomats, who could accept the wisdom that post bellum punishment was also
amoral, against the spirit of the Atlantic Charter,61 and might cause unforeseen, negative
consequences in the future.
Unsurprisingly, the ROK government vociferously demanded reparations from Japan,
and this was a source of concern for State Department planners. At face value, the concept of
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Korean reparations did not directly fit within the accepted idea of war reparations at the time. As
noted, during World War II, the United States had not classified Korea as an Allied Power but
rather as a colony of the Japanese Empire and subject to Japanese sovereignty. Although nations
like the Philippines were not sovereign states when they were invaded by Japan, it was
nevertheless indisputable that the damage caused to Filipino individuals and material assets by
Japan were almost entirely tethered to the results of Japanese behavior during the war. Korea, as
a colony under Japanese control effectively since 1905, instead asked for reparations for what it
depicted as forty years of lost development and prosperity. Addressing the matter of Japanese
reparations to Korea accordingly opened up a different line of questioning. How did its colonial
experience mesh into the American understanding of the parameters of World War II? For the
purposes of the peace treaty, how far back into the conflict in the Asia-Pacific could reparations
apply?
Japanese restitution for damages to, say, an American-owned port in the Philippines
during World War II easily fit within the traditional understanding of war reparations:
compensation for the wartime activities of the designated aggressor. Korea, on the other hand,
presented a far more extensive and complex set of indictments. Korea had been under
internationally-recognized Japanese control for nearly forty years. Korean men had served in the
Japanese military, many as conscripts but others as willing participants in Japanese-led
institutions. Some Korean women endured sexual slavery as “comfort women,” an issue
notorious enough that it persists as a controversy today. Many Korean landowners had been
replaced with Japanese landowners after the 1910 annexation. Beyond individual damages, a
variety of Korean resources from before 1910 had been depleted by 1945. Japan’s colonial
occupation had appropriated cultural objects, gold deposits, bank funds, and land from Korean

42

Jin 43
ownership.62 Simply tabulating Japanese “damages” to Korea was difficult due to the sheer
length of time covered. So too would be verifying the validity of ROK demands.
Determining validity, however, was protean in the pivotal years after the end of World
War II. Given that the Far Eastern Commission had turned into a forum for disagreement rather
than a deliberative body to consult on postwar issues. The ROK and its moral claims and
arguments about its role in the war were largely dependent on American priorities and the
mindsets of key diplomats in the State Department. Although there were almost no objections to
the transfer of ownership of Japanese assets left in Korea to Koreans—after all, the native seizure
of leftover Japanese wartime property overseas was a universal desire among nations in the AsiaPacific—the United States cooled towards the idea of reparations on the whole throughout 1947
and 1948.
The occupation in Japan underwent what historians have famously labeled as the
“Reverse Course,” as a group of cabinet members and bureaucratic powerholders in the Truman
administration opposed General MacArthur’s intentions to purge, democratize, and deconstruct
Japan’s traditional corporations (zaibatsu). Rising tensions with the Soviet Union combined with
fears of Japanese economic and political turmoil motivated members of the Truman
administration to promote stability and a softened version of rehabilitation in Japan. As a result,
reparations turned from a notion that American diplomats entertained to a taboo topic. This
geopolitical reality was able to combine with the moral argument about the desirability of
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rehabilitation instead of retribution, leading the U.S. to shift away from supporting
institutionalized reparations.63
By January 1947, the U.S. outlined its guidelines for potential reparations claimants, who
were still petitioning the Far Eastern Commission, in the form of a memorandum that circulated
through the State Department. The memorandum reflected American interests in limiting the
extent to which Japan might be held accountable for reparations. In a framing that forebode the
future difficulty of Korean advocacy for involvement in the peace treaty (and access to
reparations), the United States only invited “Belligerents to submit claims for the period of their
actual belligerency” through the FEC. Korea, obviously not an official belligerent during the
war, was left off the attached list of invited nations.64 Included, however, were nations that used
to be colonial holdings of Allied Powers and had since gained independence after the war. The
Philippines is listed with its declaration of “belligerency” against Japan listed as December 7,
1941—indicating that the current Philippine sovereign state could retroactively claim to be a
belligerent in the war against Japan since the day that its colonial authority (the United States)
entered the war.
The date of belligerency for every nation listed is after December 7, 1941, which is to be
expected since Japan never officially joined the conflict against the Allied Powers despite its pact
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with Germany and Italy until the Pearl Harbor attacks. While official date of belligerency match
up with American guidelines, this generated a few curiosities. For example, the Republic of
China’s date of belligerency is listed as December 9, 1941.65 Although the ROC had been
engaged in conflict with Imperial Japan since at least 1937, it was only two days after the attack
on Pearl Harbor that Chiang’s Nationalist government formally declared war on the Axis
Powers. While the guidelines that reparations claims could only derive from actions during the
period of “actual belligerency” might not have had any actual effect on Chinese reparations
claims (ROC officials could just as easily claim that certain damages from the five preceding
years of war all occurred from December 9, 1941 on), the imposition of these formal guidelines
indicates the limits of American understanding and receptiveness to reparations claims
originating from before the American entry into the war.
Regardless of the local history of conflict with Japanese imperialism, the January 1947
memorandum highlights how American planners anxiously sought to re-center postwar issues on
the idea of the outbreak of global conflict with the Axis Powers, regardless of any local history
of conflict with Japan. Wartime reparations could only be just that—compensation for Japanese
actions during World War II alone. In doing so, the United States had found a legal foothold that
could limit how much Japan (and by extension, American foreign aid) would be responsible for
redressing.
Beyond the obvious problems that the January 1947 framing of reparations issues posed
for ROK interests in compensation, there was also greater symbolic significance of the American
insistence that claims needed to be time limited. The broader scope of Japanese aggression in
Asia, and its longstanding policy of colonialism, needed to remain outside the purview of
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reparations and of a future peace treaty generally. From the American perspective, a peace treaty,
being a multilateral document comprising all belligerents in the war with Japan, could not be
charged with the responsibility of satisfying all complaints with Japanese behavior in the AsiaPacific. Doing so was not only practically difficult, but also dangerous to American designs
which required the speedy rehabilitation and retooling of Japanese assets.
But while other nations still had the opportunity to seek reparations claims, albeit only
those damages originating from a limited time frame, Korea received no such accommodations.
Korea was neither a former colony of an Allied Power or a recognized belligerent. It fit none of
the categories the United States had laid out before it. The non-recognition of the KPG during
the war had grave implications for postwar ROK efforts. The ROK was unable to successfully
claim that Koreans had actively suffered on behalf of the Allied war effort whereas many other
reparations claimants could argue on behalf of the sacrifices of their peoples and resources.
American diplomats believed that Korean claims did not stem from a genuine desire to
receive compensation for damages incurred as a war combatant, but rather as an opportunistic,
newly-independent country with a particular grudge against Japan. American reservations were
summarized in a December 12, 1949 report published by the department’s Division of Research
for the Far East:
“While the claim of the Republic of Korea for participation in the Japanese peace
settlement is based on its alleged status as a belligerent during the war and many
of the present officials of the Republic of Korea have considered themselves
belligerents against Japan since the annexation of Korea in 1910, the interests of
Korea in the peace settlement appear to arise more from the consequences of
annexation and forty years of exploitation than from the war itself, which was
merely the incident that separated Korea from Japan.”66
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The report concluded: “[R]egardless of Korea’s legal status, Korean interests in the Japanese
peace settlement are not derived primarily from belligerency against Japan in World War
II...Instead, Korean interests are derived almost wholly from Japanese imperial rule over Korea
during the period 1910-1945.”67 Korea’s claims for war reparations and its signatory aspirations,
the report declared, belonged to a separate conflict—the Japanese Occupation of Korea—whose
sole relation to World War II was that it bore the same termination date.
For American policymakers, Japanese colonialism, or the colonial experience of Korea
more generally, was not a valid point of conversation when discussing postwar policy. The
United States could not be an accessory to what it saw as vengeance, especially when doing so
would damage the most important American asset in Asia—a revitalized, allied, and subordinate
Japan. In other words, America was instituting a new postwar order for Asia, but the State
Department was accepting none of the responsibility for resolving persisting colonial
controversies.
Notably, the December 12 report does not immediately suggest that the United States
dismiss the Korean position out of hand. Instead, a determination of Korea’s status vis-a-vis the
peace settlement would depend on “an estimation of the line of conduct likely to be followed by
the Republic of Korea...”68 The report revealed the criteria by which the State Department
evaluated ROK claims that could have garnered Korea signatory status, albeit six months before
the start of the Korean War. In other words, the “line of conduct” of a Korean delegation would
have to be compliant and not an obstruction to American priorities.
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The ROK was not the only party involved that saw reparations as an important issue. The
Philippines, too, lobbied heavily for reparations from Japan, which proved to be a point which
the United States had to repeatedly fend off, usually asserting that Japan’s brittle economy had
no ability to pay.69 Concerns about burdening Japan with reparations, for both ideological and
strategic reasons, meant that even those nations who had clearly demonstrable claims of damages
stemming directly from the war were nevertheless hard-pressed to find sympathetic American
ears.
It was in this same vein that State Department officials gave the ROK’s claims for
damages short shrift. As the 1949 State Department research report described, “[The ROK’s]
claims appear to be excessive, as currently stated, and also pose a peculiar problem because of
the long time period covered.” The report goes on to conclude that if the U.S. allowed the ROK
to participate in peace negotiations, Korean diplomats would likely demand a punitive treaty, due
to both the Korean public’s anti-Japanese sentiment and the ROK government’s need to appear
more anti-Japanese than the North. Ultimately, the report’s authors advocated that the ROK be
given a consultative, but ultimately meaningless, role in the peace settlement—something that
would allow the United States to shut down any demands for excessive reparations but
nevertheless satisfy the Korean public’s “sensibilities on the question of participation.”70 In other
words, to limit the ROK’s role in a peace treaty to the minimum necessary to prevent rampant
anti-Americanism in Korea.
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Other American reports worked to diminish sympathy for Korean reparations claims. In
May 1951, only a few months before the San Francisco Conference itself, the Department of
Research for the Far East issued a report outlining the extent of originally-Japanese assets in
southern Korea at the end of the war compared with Korean claims in Japan. After tabulating
pre-war and wartime investment and Japanese-owned property values in Korea, the report
concludes that “Japanese assets in the Republic of Korea alone [excluding assets north of the 38th
parallel] were approximately four times larger than any ROK claims against Japan.”71 Although
the report does not take into account any value of ROK reparations claims, it serves the purpose
of outlining how much the ROK had supposedly already benefited by appropriating Japanese
assets and property in Korea at the end of the war. It also lends credence to the politicallycharged and controversial assumption that Japanese occupation had also brought the positive
externality of investment and economic development in Korea, altering the conversation from
one of moral redress to that of a monetary exchange.
Of course, beneath the retraction of American willingness was the growing aversion to
reparations generally. Rhetorically, top American policymakers began to emphasize the necessity
of reconciliation rather than retribution. Reparations were dismissed for reasons of strategy and
expediency, but represented a bigger moral question the US did not want to answer. The United
States shuffled the issue of compensation off of the agenda of a multilateral document, instead
separating itself from the matter of negotiating reparations and leaving all claimants to conclude
separate bilateral agreements with Japan. Reparations ran counter to both American ideological
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concerns about avoiding the mistakes of Versailles and its forward-looking interest in rebuilding
Japan as an ally amenable to American grand strategy.

b. One Last Gasp
The changing calculus prompted by a heightening Cold War would have further reduced
Korean chances of participation given the ROK’s rhetoric on the matter of reparations. But an
argument can be made that the Korean War dramatically raised the prominence of the ROK
government—Korea was no longer an Asian backwater; rather, it was part of the new front line
against a monolithic Communist threat. Surely, on the basis of prosecuting the Korean War, the
United States should have a greater incentive to curate positive feelings among the Korean public
and the ROK government towards the West. Additionally, the ROK government might have had
more leverage to argue that Korea deserved a place at the conference, given that it could frame
its losses in the Korean War as casualties in the fight against global communism and thus a
member of America’s “free world” coalition.
Indeed, the ROK government did exactly that, often tying together its interests in a peace
treaty with the American strategy of containment. By emphasizing the dangers of the external
threat of communism, too, Korean diplomats sought to burnish the Korean reputation as scornful
of an exonerating peace treaty, and therefore seek to disabuse Americans of the notion that a
Korean delegation would somehow derail U.S. plans for the peace treaty. In November 1950,
one Korean diplomat met with at least one top ranking American member of SCAP, and stated
that “the war in Korea had convinced his Government that the greatest enemy of both [Japan and
Korea] is communism, and that for this reason his Government is interested in seeing that a
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treaty with Japan results in a just and honorable peace.”72 Although his American counterpart
equivocated with a diplomatic non-answer, the conversation demonstrates that the Korean
government was not a passive agent after the start of the Korean War, instead finding ways to
frame its advocacy for participation in the peace treaty through different ways that would be
amenable to American sympathies.
Furthermore, the United States did begin to evaluate ROK participation in the peace
treaty on slightly more expanded grounds at the start of 1951. Cheong Sung-hwa argues that the
U.S. did indeed become more receptive towards ROK participation in early 1951. Dulles had
expressed an interest in “building up” the ROK’s international presence and legitimacy. Bringing
Seoul onto a multilateral treaty that symbolized the end of World War II and global
reconciliation would reaffirm the ROK’s status as a valued, accredited member of the
international system, which was important given that the United Nations had technically
intervened in the Korean War on behalf of the ROK.73 Although there is little to no evidence that
Korean messaging in late 1950 had any impact on Dulles, both Korean diplomatic rhetoric and
Dulles’ new interests reflected the role that Cold War developments reshaped old assumptions.
Implicit in Dulles’ framing is the American belief that Korea did indeed have a role in
contemporary American designs for Northeast Asia of some kind after the start of the Korean
War. Inclusion on a peace treaty could very well be painless and limited in substance, but
valuable symbolically. The ROK’s international legitimacy in 1951, then, was of enough
importance that Dulles was using it as a criterion for determining signatory status. Subsequently,
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the U.S. team initiated discussions to obtain approval for the ROK’s participation in the peace
treaty.
These discussions encountered difficulties with the Japanese government, led by Prime
Minister Yoshida Shigeru. Yoshida’s government was concerned about Korean participation, not
for reasons of potential reparations to the ROK, but actually because of what participation would
mean for the legal status of Koreans residing within Japan. Japan feared that the 600,000 ethnic
Koreans residing in Japan would be considered nationals of an Allied power, if the ROK were to
be a treaty signer. The treaty had provided for nationals of Allied powers to be compensated for
any property or wealth in Japan seized during the war. The Koreans living in Japan included both
long-time residents and recent immigrants, but their legal status was now ambiguous and the
ROK government claimed all of them as “Korean nationals.”74
The Japanese government was determined to prevent Koreans in Japan from accessing
the treaty compensation clauses for Allied nationals, which was motivated both by Japanese
concerns about having to compensate wartime victims and a long history of Japanese racism and
mistrust towards its Korean minority.75 Pieces of an informal discussion between Shirasu Jiro, an
advisor to Yoshida, and a State Department official, who was also a family friend of Shirasu’s,
on May 1, 1950 gives credence to the stipulation that personal attitudes of Japanese towards
Koreans might have later affected treaty negotiations. As the State Department official later
recounted, “[Shirasu] thought that the best way to deal with the 600,000 Koreans still living in
Japan was to deport them to Korea. In his opinion, the Koreans in Japan were almost to a man
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engaged in illegal or non-gainful pursuits and that it was grossly unfair that the Japanese
government … [had to] assume obligations on behalf of this parasitic group.”76 Still, on April 23,
1951, the Japanese government ultimately informed the United States that it would acquiesce in
Korean participation “if it is definitely assured that by the said treaty Korean residents in Japan
will not acquire the status of Allied Powers nationals.”77 The most obvious source of obstruction
had been cleared. Why then, after American treaty negotiators met with British diplomats later
that month, did the U.S. inform the ROK on July 3rd that Korea would not be allowed to sign the
treaty after all?
Cheong speculated that British lobbying against the ROK likely played a significant role.
On May 16, John Allison issued a notice to Dulles that the United States, after conferring with
the British ambassador, was now prepared to drop the issue of ROK participation. Instead, a new
clause would be drafted to grant the ROK certain benefits of the treaty.78 No records, to my
knowledge, exist of the final meeting between the British and the Americans that tipped the
scales against Korean participation. In the State Department’s published volumes of selected
diplomatic documents, Foreign Relations of the United States, there is merely an editorial note
that “Other reference of this talk has not been found in State Department files.”79 The State
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Department records in the National Archives at College Park, too, have almost no documentation
as to what was said that indicates British reasoning for Korean exclusion or the specific grounds
that led the American team to finally drop the issue.
However little we might know about what the convincing logic was, it is significant that
the United States was prepared to drop the issue of Korean participation after only a handful of
meetings with British negotiators.
Rhee and other ROK leaders had been arguing for Korean signatory status for almost two
years, so it was clear to Washington that this was an emotional issue that mattered deeply to both
the Korean leadership and public. Regardless of British views, the rapidity of U.S. concurrence
indicates that the United States was already inclined to view the Korean case as unimportant in
terms of the broader schedule of priorities and only gave it a second glance when Dulles believed
that inclusion might boost the ROK’s international status. For Dulles and other American
negotiators, Korean participation might have had some merits, but by no means was it a hill
worth dying on.
There were enough issues to make Korean participation in the treaty inconvenient and
problematic. Korean demands for “excessive” reparations, the ambiguous status of the 600,000
Koreans living in Japan and whether they would be eligible for compensation for wartime
mistreatment, compounded by British opposition, all meant that involving the ROK could delay
the peace treaty, which was scheduled for September 1951. The peace treaty effort, a timesensitive matter and a vital part of US strategy in Asia, could not be delayed by Korean interests.
The ROK Ambassador to the United States Yang would repeatedly seek reconsideration
for Korea’s case between July and September 1951. His efforts were met with a mixture of
sympathetic but firm refusals and outright scolding for making a fuss. At a July 19 meeting
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between Yang and Dulles, Dulles expressed frustration that Yang had made a press statement in
which the disgruntled ambassador had asserted that Japan was not fully rehabilitated and had not
satisfactorily made amends for its imperialist behavior in Korea. “Mr. Dulles pointed out the
difficulty and delicacy of the position of the United States in its efforts to obtain a reasonable and
satisfactory treaty with Japan...and stressed the importance, in this matter, of Korean
understanding and cooperation.”80 In August, Yang met with Assistant Secretary Rusk, making
another pitch to the effect that Korean exclusion would be damaging at a psychological level to
both the ROK government and the Korean people. Rusk brushed off Yang’s points, responding
“that the absence of a Korean delegation should not be considered as a loss of prestige for [the]
ROK, and that it might be wiser for [the] ROK not to make such an issue of the matter…”81
The chief attitude that seemed to characterize American responses is “annoyance”, as
American officials had to devote energy to damage control after the decision to exclude the
ROK. Dulles attempted to impress on Yang the importance of a cause larger than Korean issues.
Rusk implied that repeated Korean lobbying was unnecessary squawking for the sake of national
pride. Dismissiveness among American diplomats towards Korean lobbying was clearly still as
prevalent in 1951 as it had been in the late 1940s, and dovetailed with American overall
unreceptiveness to emotional Korean appeals.
As the date of the San Francisco conference drew closer, one State Department official
did submit a proposal to have the ROK attend the conference as an observer, which would not
allow the ROK to sign the treaty but at the very least allow a delegation to be officially
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represented during the conference. The purpose of observer status would seek to smooth over
ROK-Japan relations by diminishing any reason for the ROK to have a “chip in[sic] its
shoulder.” The proposal author went on to say, “From a strictly moral point of view, it would
seem only fair that the Koreans, who have suffered from Japanese oppression for more than 40
years, should be represented in some capacity in San Francisco.” Dulles personally responded to
the proposal with a handwritten note, merely stating: “While from a strictly Korean point of view
I agree with the above, I believe such actions would get us into many difficulties and open a
Pandora’s Box which we would regret.”82 The ROK was instead offered a downgraded invitation
of being informal guests to the conference who could receive some assistance in booking their
hotels—an offer to which the ROK did not respond.83
Dulles did not elaborate on what he believed was within that proverbial “Pandora’s Box.”
But in an environment imbued with the need to implement American grand strategic plans as
quickly as possible, we may speculate with some confidence that he already decided that Korean
exclusion was the path of least resistance. Interpreted by Dulles, Korean issues and moral claim
to wartime victimhood were insignificant compared to what the U.S. framed as the needs of the
free world.

IV.

Conclusion

The narrative of ROK exclusion from the San Francisco Peace Treaty reveals the tension
among varying roles that the peace treaty could have performed. It was a grand strategic device
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that ushered in a political-security perimeter in the Pacific, but it also symbolized at least a
modicum of rehabilitation, reconciliation, and redress for the past. It could deliver due attention
to those nations affected by World War II and marginalized by “Allied power” designations.
Additionally, American diplomats were conscious of Asia’s colonial past and had an opportunity
to demonstrate that American leadership would be distinctly different. It is not surprising that the
treaty failed to operate in all of its ideal ways. For the ROK, its moral claims to have a seat at the
table with Japan suited neither American post-war intentions or Cold War strategy.
Korea arguably always had at least a small chance of achieving signatory status on the
peace treaty. State Department planners struggled to fit Korea’s historical experience within the
confines of the American understanding of World War II. American negotiators later latched
onto the conclusion that Korea did not belong among the ranks of Allied powers when Korea’s
claims of victimhood conflicted with the desired course of Japanese rehabilitation. Similarly, the
process of “Asianizing” the peace conference was impersonal and not tailored to the specifics of
individual Asian nations. It was ultimately guided by public relations concerns rather than a
motivation to resolve the root causes of anti-Western and anti-colonialist attitudes in Asia.
Consequently, Korea’s absence did little to delegitimize the U.S.-led venture, given the presence
and tokenized function of other “Asiatic” delegations in the conference hall.
Presented side-by-side, Korean moral claims also paled in comparison to U.S. and other
Western security concerns, at least from the perspective in Washington. Korea had always had an
argument based on its moral right to be involved with the treaty, yet the United States only came
close to inviting the ROK after the start of the Korean War and concerns arose about the ROK
government’s international prestige. The American interest in corralling potential sources for
anti-American sentiment argued in favor of Korean inclusion, but was also subordinate to
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security concerns. Longer-held assumptions that the ROK might be obstreperous and muddle the
treaty process came to the fore as Korea proved to be a less-than-ideal participant. Even though
Korean participation in the San Francisco Peace Treaty might have built up the ROK’s
international legitimacy and the occasional American diplomat believed that the ROK had a
moral right to be represented, most American negotiators essentially believed that the strategic
advantage of the peace treaty was far greater than any matter of Korean national pride.
The result was a smoothly-run peace conference that concluded within two days but left
the ROK government and public frustrated and resentful. Japan had formally recognized Korean
independence and assented to the seizure of Japanese assets left in Korea. But Korea had been
denied a chance to address Japan directly about its forty years of colonial status. Basic
diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea would not be established until 1965,
fourteen years after the peace treaty and six years after Dulles had died.
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Chapter 3
Multilateral, Multi-problematic

Security arrangements went hand in hand with the San Francisco Peace Treaty. By early
1950, the State Department had already reconceived the peace treaty as part and parcel of its
wider security designs in Northeast Asia. At the same time as they were drafting the peace treaty,
American planners had to conceptualize what the region would look like post-treaty. Scholars
have been interested in the peace treaty for its role in spawning the retroactively-labeled “San
Francisco System,” which itself is defined by the prevalence of bilateral security alliances
between the United States and various countries in the Asia-Pacific. As many American
diplomats and their foreign counterparts simultaneously engaged in discussions related to the
peace treaty and security agreements, it is thus important to examine the nature of the security
arrangements which stemmed from negotiating the peace treaty. The reasons behind the State
Department’s support for a bilateral security architecture in Asia, after rejecting proposals for a
multilateral alliance, in turn reveals new dimensions of American diplomatic decision-making
which coincided and intersected with the peace treaty.
At the start of 1949, the United States had nearly no formal military agreements with
countries based along the western rim of the Pacific Ocean.84 The U.S. had had formal alliances
with many nations in the Asia-Pacific during World War II, but with the end of hostilities with
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Japan and the lapsing of cooperation through the Far Eastern Commission, the U.S. was afforded
a generous level of flexibility in terms of its policy in the region. Beyond occupation duties in
Japan and the residue of cooperation with many other nations, the United States was informally
bound to events in the region but formally detached. The period of 1949 to 1951 stood as a
critical moment where the United States had the choice regarding how to shape and implement a
comprehensive security structure for the region. In doing so, the U.S. not only evaluated its
capacity and interests in the region, but also its confidence in involvement in Asia as well as its
confidence in Asian partners.
The American emphasis on bilateral alliances and partnerships with countries in the AsiaPacific stands in stark contrast to the American reliance on NATO—a multilateral military
alliance—in Europe. Rather than encouraging cooperation between partners, the U.S. instead
operated on a one-to-one dynamic, engineering mutually exclusive relationships between itself
and other nations like Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia, and others. But this
outcome was never a foregone conclusion. Instead, in 1949-51 the United States encountered the
idea of creating an alliance mirroring NATO in Asia, under the title of a “Pacific Pact.” The end
result of American bilateralism in Asia only came after a brief period where the United States
toyed with the idea of a broader multilateral security collective for Asia.
Unlike Europe, the United States faced what amounted to an unfamiliar landscape in the
Asia-Pacific. A rapidly changing geopolitical landscape compounded by the respective
frangibility of potential partners incentivized American planners and diplomats to respond to and
develop proposals on short notice, often choosing the path of least resistance. In the minds of
American planners, “Asia” was a frontier fraught with uncertainty and self-interested allies. This
promoted reactive measures with only hastily-sketched out evaluations of long-term results. Akin
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to the bilateral negotiating style of the Dulles team with the San Francisco Peace Treaty, this
chapter argues that the United States also sought to preserve maximum flexibility even whilst
juggling its responsibilities as the largest diplomatic mover in the region.
Importantly, Japan was the only nation that the United States could have complete
reliance on, and subsequently became the cornerstone of all future proposals and the centerpiece
consideration when responding to Asian proposals. The United States did not necessarily believe
that “Asianness” was an indicator of incompetence, but rather meshed together evaluations of the
limited political/military capacities of certain Asian countries with cultural assumptions. With
the advent of Cold Warrior mentalities and geopolitically-motivated fears, American policymakers actively decided to maximize flexibility and freedom of action wherever possible.
Fundamentally, Asia’s construction as a “frontier” and the western rim of the Pacific Ocean as an
outward perimeter of American security, rather than the Pacific as a region with its own
centripetal force, limited American beliefs at the time that any comprehensive involvement could
be productive.

I.

Indigenous Momentum, or the Lack Thereof

The United States and twelve other European nations signed the North Atlantic Treaty,
which would lead to the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), on April 4,
1949. Speaking at the formal treaty signing ceremony in Washington D.C., some representatives
believed that NATO, although transformative, was only an evolution of past European efforts to
create a collective union and alliance in Western Europe. “As we have participated in the making
and implementing the Brussels Pact,” stated the Dutch Foreign Minister Dirk Stikker,
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referencing the 1948 military alliance between France, the UK, and the Benelux nations, “...so
shall we participate in making the [North Atlantic] treaty now before us a living and inspiring
reality.”85 For Stikker, NATO’s intergovernmental tendrils were not novel. They were merely an
Americanized extension that worked upon well-trodden European efforts. In President Truman’s
address of the same day, a common theme was the emphasis of common interests overcoming
national boundaries. “There are different kinds of governmental and economic systems, just as
there are different languages and different culture. But these differences present no real obstacle
to the voluntary association of free nations…”86 Commonality and cooperation breaking past
traditional boundaries was a colorful characteristic of U.S.-European diplomacy, and indicative
of the American belief that regional stability in Europe was a net benefit for the United States.
While NATO negotiations had been underway for months, rumors also spread of a
proposal for a mirrored alliance system in the Pacific. The Philippines, Australia, and Great
Britain all indicated their interest in expanded American involvement in Asia, using a similar
arrangement that American diplomats seemed so willing to implement in Europe. Both Australia
and the Philippines were anxious about a resurgent Japan and saw themselves on a frontline with
Communist machinations in Asia. Great Britain, although not promoting a military pact,
carefully lobbied the U.S. to increase aid to Southeast Asia, citing the need to draw nations
vulnerable to communism into a western orbit.87 However, in a March 22, 1949 press conference
Secretary of State Acheson dismissed the idea that the United States was at all considering a pact
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for the Pacific. “Acheson...pointed out that there are already existing agencies for handling
problems in the Orient,” the St. Louis Post-Dispatch reported, adding that Acheson cited the Far
Eastern Commission and the Allied Council of Japan (ACJ) as examples of such agencies. 88 It
should be noted that both the FEC and ACJ were organizations intended to oversee the
occupation of Japan, but which were in effect subordinate to American prerogatives.
Yet, the concept of a Pacific Pact did not die overnight. Both Syngman Rhee’s
government in South Korea and Chiang Kai-Shek’s regime, which was in the process of
relocating to Taiwan, embraced the idea wholeheartedly. In early July, Chiang Kai-shek issued a
joint communique with President Quirino of the Philippines, outlining their plans to establish a
Pacific Pact as well as their motivation for such an alliance.
In view of the lack of close collaboration among [Far Eastern nations] in the past,
and considering the gravity of the Communist menace which confronts their
freedom and independence today, we deem it necessary that these countries
should at once organize themselves into a union for the purpose of achieving
solidarity and mutual assistance to contain and counteract that common threat.89
On the same day, Rhee endorsed the proposal with an effusive telegram from Seoul.90 Despite a
dearth of American interest in a multilateral alliance in Asia, those interested parties in the pact
attempted to build their own momentum through public pronouncements echoing Truman’s
rhetoric of common goals overcoming national boundaries.
American analysts were skeptical of the intentions of Rhee, Chiang, and Quirino. A July
15 memorandum from the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (ONAA) described the latest

Stokes, Richard L. “Acheson Denies U.S. is Turning Iran into Base.” St. Louis PostDispatch. 23 March 1949.
88

89

FRUS 1949 Vol. VII, Part 2, Document 330.

90

Mabon, 153.
63

Jin 64
proposals from Rhee as little more than another iteration of Korean lobbying for aid that the
United States was not prepared to give. “Korea...seeking arms and a U.S. military guarantee of
its frontiers, has been most vociferous in advocating for a pact with US participation. Direct
appeals for large supplies of arms and a US military commitment having failed, Rhee is heartily
endorsing the [pact proposals], presumably hoping to attain his goals indirectly.”91 Only a few
days after the delivery of the ONAA memo, Secretary of State Acheson issued a telegram to
several American embassies and echoed the memo’s assumptions. “DEPT considers ChiangQuirino proposal for Pacific Union [as the] result [of] primarily [Chinese] Nationalist and Rhee
initiative seeking supplementary means [to] appeal for US MIL aid and influence U.S. public
opinion…”.92 Functionally, Acheson instructed State diplomats to respond ambiguously to
entreaties for a Pacific Pact, neither denying the possibility that the US could become interested
in an alliance nor agreeing that such a future was close at hand. This approach fit an overall
American attitude of wishing to encourage anti-communist governments in Asia while remaining
fearful of involvement with unreliable or fragile regimes.
The State Department was right to believe that Syngman Rhee’s Pacific Pact proposals
were not selfless. Two months earlier, Rhee plainly indicated that the ROK’s national security,
rather than any belief in a broader collective vision, motivated his interests in a Pacific Pact. In
May 16, Rhee publicly outlined that he hoped the U.S. would either (1) join a Pacific Pact
including Korea, (2) adopt a mutual defense agreement with Korea alone, or (3) make a “public
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declaration or pledge to defend a reunited democratic, independent Korea.”93 Rhee’s statements
that he valued a multilateral alliance equally with a U.S.-ROK defense agreement undercut any
effort to present himself as a champion of Asian multilateralism. However, those motivations
were ultimately similar to the realpolitik concerns of Western European nations that successfully
sought an Atlantic Pact involving the United States earlier that year. In other words, a similar
dynamic would have been at play: countries concerned about security seeking American defense
guarantees of some kind.
The State Department adopted a variety of rhetorical arguments to push back against
early Pacific Pact proposals. In May, Acheson ruled out the possibility of a Pacific Pact despite
the looming collapse of the Nationalist regime in China, arguing that a pact would not be
practical until the internal strife among Asian nations was resolved.94 Holding up the NATO pact
as a success story, Acheson outlined that Asian nations would have to demonstrate a similar level
of political stability and self-initiative with multilateral alliances before the U.S. would
contemplate joining a defense union.
Rhee was not a passive agent during this exchange of arguments. He soon held his own
press conference and pointed out that he had reversed priorities. While Acheson listed a
prerequisite—that Asian nations achieve internal stability prior to American support—Rhee was
immediately concerned that Asian nations, especially his own, would not be able to maintain
domestic stability without American support. For Rhee, the threat that faced noncommunist
states like his own was internal communist subversion, and greater international support was
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vital to preventing the possibility of his government toppling.95 Waiting for issues internal to
Asia to be “resolved” before the promulgation of a Pacific Pact could be catastrophic for the
cause of anti-communism in Asia.
The disparity between Rhee’s and Acheson’s statements exposes the diverging mindsets
that the two statesmen had regarding multilateralism in Asia generally, as well as the vastly
different responsibilities that both nations would expect in an alliance. Rhee’s nakedly
authoritarian rule had a shaky grasp domestically. In 1948 alone, two large-scale rebellions
erupted in South Korea which the ROK government only suppressed after violent military
crackdowns.96 Simultaneously, Rhee was keenly aware that his 50,000-man military would be no
match for the burgeoning DPRK army to the north, which far outnumbered the South. In 1949,
the ROK was in no position to contribute to the material betterment of other allies. Acheson, and
the U.S. government generally, may have also viewed the world with a mindset of contingency
in 1949, as evidenced by American efforts like the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe and the
creation of NATO that spring.
However, the combination of build-downs since World War II, defense sequesters, and
the relative distance between Washington and hot zones around the globe resulted in a
fundamentally different attitude towards events in East Asia. In the same vein of thinking that led
to the Department of Army advocating for an early end to the occupation of Korea (to free up
much-needed Army divisions for duties elsewhere in the world), the United States may have
been willing to expend resources in clear crisis zones, but was not similarly generous with
questionable partners in East Asia. After it became clear in 1949 that the Chinese Communist
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Party would likely defeat Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government, the United States had to
come to grips with reality if it were to face a land conflict in Asia. After Chiang Kai-shek
relocated to Taiwan, the United States would not have a powerful ally on the Asian mainland to
call upon. Consequently, the tangible military resources designated for distribution in Asia were
distinctly limited despite American profligacy in foreign engagements elsewhere.
Furthermore, the State Department repeatedly argued that the United States would not be
responsible for engendering the level of collective spirit required for a multilateral arrangement
to “work.” In August 1949, after several months of ROK and ROC lobbying, Acheson
telegraphed the American embassy in the Philippines, outlining the State Department view that
the formation and development of an Asia-Pacific pact depended “on indigenous incentive and
momentum developed in [the] countries concerned.” Additionally, “In [the] DEPT’s view, [the]
coalescence [of a] viable [Asian union] can come about only through genuine self-discovery of
common purpose and mutual need.” The anti-communist stances of the South Korean,
Nationalist Chinese, and Filipino governments, then, was apparently not a sufficient “common
purpose.” Most importantly, however, “encouragement by the US might well arouse expectations
of US economic assistance to an association of [Asian] members beyond any [levels] now
contemplated.”97 The chief opposition in official American policy to a Pacific Pact stemmed
from this idea: that the U.S. would find itself required to support self-labelled “anti-communist”
regimes in Asia and trapped in disadvantageous commitments.
There are several assumptions at play in the formulation of State Department responses
towards a Pacific Pact. Firstly, the United States was not interested in producing a Marshall Plan
for Asia or subsidizing ostensibly anti-communist states in the region. Early plans for the
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Marshall Plan had actually included an Asian component—in 1947-48 future Secretary of State
Dean Acheson had expressed a clear interest in rebuilding Asia as well as Europe. However, due
to the difficulty of passing the already-contentious Marshall Plan through Congress, the Asian
component was shelved. This move produced the Europe-only aid plan and left Congress to
consider and pass aid bills to specific Asian nations on a case-by-case basis.98 It would not be
possible to fulfill all, or many of, the requests for aid from Asian allies.
Secondly, the United States was not convinced that the conditions were right for the U.S.
to be involved in the creation of an Asia-Pacific pact. “Indigenous incentive and momentum”
were required to formulate a pact. The resulting alliance, then, would be characteristically
“indigenously”-produced and managed. The Pacific Pact, in other words, would not be adopted
by the U.S. as an extension of an overarching global policy. Instead, it could only function as a
club for Asian members to interact with one another, connected to the broader U.S. global grand
strategy through their individual bilateral relations with Washington. Unlike NATO, which was
surrounded by high-minded rhetoric on the importance of relations that crossed traditional
geographic boundaries, the Pacific Pact of 1949 had distinctly “Asian” connotations. Such a
connotation, as opposed to potential shared interests like non-communism or fighting for peace
in the world, limited its relevance to the United States. In the eyes of American policymakers, at
least publicly, they designated a Pacific Pact as strictly an “indigenous” affair that could only
solve “indigenous” problems, not global ones. Whereas American diplomats saw themselves as
in the thick of matters in Europe and actively taking the initiative to influence the course of
events, the Asia-Pacific was a different story. The U.S. would not take the bait and find itself
involved on a frontier from which it was separated—not conjoined—by the vast Pacific Ocean.
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American charges that the 1949 Pacific Pact proposals lacked “indigenous momentum”
also provided a contrast that helps explain hearty American cooperation through NATO. NATO,
American diplomats stated, was not an American-headed institution or an original American
concept—rather, it was the evolution of existing European efforts at multilateralism prior to the
formulation of the North Atlantic alliance. A history of regional multilateral cooperation, then,
was “proof” that potential participants would be genuinely interested in lowering national
barriers among themselves, rather than simply using a multilateral arrangement to extract aid
from the “big” power in the alliance. To define “momentum” in a diplomatic sense, it would
involve both sustained and transnational enthusiasm for an idea as well as the conclusion of other
international agreements and pacts that could eventually point towards a NATO-like alliance
involving the U.S.
Such a prerequisite may have been understandable in a practical sense. If the United
States entered into an arrangement with nations that already had seasoned diplomatic corps,
foreign policy institutes, and experience with international political-military cooperation, such an
arrangement would subsequently require less training, effort, and leadership responsibilities from
the U.S. In a qualitative sense, too, historical evidence of multilateralism would indicate the
“sincerity” of potential parties’ interest in a pact. On the other hand, it makes little sense to argue
that a history of multilateralism was required given that many potential Asian members were
newly-independent countries. The Republic of Korea would have simply had no opportunity to
acquire the level of pre-alliance historical experience necessary to satisfy Acheson’s listed
prerequisites prior to the formation of a Pacific Pact.
Additionally, two of the main parties calling for a pact—the ROC and the ROK—had
leaders and governments with little standing in the eyes of American diplomats. Although
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military and political limitations on American commitments abroad would have engendered
lukewarm responses to the pact proposals of 1949 anyways, the sense that both Chiang and
Rhee’s government were riddled with corruption and incompetence generated the perception of
an even more unfavorable environment in Asia beyond the already difficult security issues.
Another clue answering why the U.S. responded coolly to the idea of a Pacific Pact lies in
a memorandum sent between from an Asian affairs analyst to the Near Eastern Affairs
department within the State Department on March 1950. In a curious line of reasoning, the
memo argues that a Pacific Pact would entail a concrete defense line in Asia, and in doing so,
would consequently expose more countries than it would protect. A formal defense agreement in
the Far East would have to be followed by agreements in South Asia and the Middle East, so as
to not spark feelings of “abandonment” by those nations outside of the Pacific Pact.99 In other
words, formally defining the extent of American commitments was dangerous, inflexible, and
risked serving as a trigger for other commitments elsewhere. If definition posed risks, then the
solution is to be indefinite. American rhetoric could remain equivocal, vague, and generally
supportive, which would allow foreign nations to continue to believe that American support
could be forthcoming in the future.
The United States would have seen the creation of an anti-communist pact in Asia as too
draining on American resources and too definitive in terms of who the pact would both protect
and protect against. In 1949, ambiguity, in terms of reducing anxiety about the availability of
American aid, was the best course of action when the United States itself had no long-term
projection for its commitments in the Asia-Pacific.

“Memorandum from Mr. Hare to Mr. Howard, Subject: Japanese Peace and Security
Settlement.” 17 March 1950, Box 1, Folder “Butterworth’s Peace Treaty Files”, Records
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II. Coopting the Pact

Despite the 1949 pact proposals fizzling out by the end of the year, the term “Pacific
Pact” saw a revival beginning with the commencement of negotiations for a Japanese peace
treaty. Strangely enough, American diplomats floated the idea of a multilateral alliance and
sounded out interest from its partners in the Pacific, even though less than a year earlier the State
Department had dismissed a Pact as premature and lacking the requisite enthusiasm among
potential participants. Instead, as the peace treaty transitioned from existing solely on the drafts
of State Department planners to an international negotiating process, the United States found
itself willing to exert the necessary force which could not only formalize an international peace
treaty, but also a collective alliance for Asia.
Of course, American proposals for a “NATO in Asia” never came to fruition, much like
the Chiang-Quirino-Rhee proposal. By April 1951, the State Department abandoned plans for a
multilateral arrangement, repurposing collective security designs into a series of bilateral
agreements. Those agreements culminated in the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, the Mutual Defense
Treaty between the U.S. and the Philippines, and the ANZUS Treaty, which bound together
Australia, New Zealand, and the U.S. Despite the non-event of a 1951 Pacific Pact, the reasons
for both American initial intentions and eventual dismissal of the idea reflect the priorities,
mindsets, and strategic considerations of the State Department and other government planning
agencies at the time. Risk was avoided and flexibility maximized. Additionally, despite renewed
American interest in a pact, Korea was distinctly absent from any proposals. Korean exclusion at
this stage brought to the fore the recurring strategic and geopolitical reservations the United
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States had towards involvement in Asia, and also emphasized the contingent, coincidental nature
of American support for the ROK during the Korean War.

a. Towards a NATO in Asia
American reliance on Japan was promoted by Cold War considerations, but had difficulty
reconciling with lingering wartime and postcolonial fears from other Asian nations. As discussed
in the previous chapter, Cold War-motivated mindsets led American planners to pivot towards
restoring Japanese sovereignty, in order to bolster American capabilities in East Asia. Yet the
American about-face in its attitude towards Japan was far from universal among nations in the
Asia-Pacific. Largely spared from the dangers of bombings, occupation, or invasion, American
diplomats could not look within their own wartime experiences in order to sympathize with the
tepid response of nations along the western edge of the Pacific Rim when announcing the end of
the occupation in Japan. For countries like Australia, the Philippines, and especially the ROK,
simply labeling Japan as “rehabilitated” did little to assuage the fresh memories of Japan’s
imperial ambitions. The United States faced the difficult task of reassuring both its partners and
other global observers that the end of its occupation in Japan would not endanger long-term
regional security while seeking to obtain short-term advantages against the Soviet Union and the
PRC.
Embedded in a May 5, 1950, draft from the Assistant Secretary of Far Eastern Affairs at
the time is a discussion of the two types of concurrent security arrangements discussed by the
U.S. government, although the author of the draft deemed neither as entirely acceptable to
American interests yet. The first possibility could be a “collective security arrangement” with
common standards of mutual defense among any participating nations. The second possibility
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would be a quasi-continuation of the status quo, where SCAP and other Allied occupation
authorities in Japan would exercise sovereign control over Japan’s foreign policy and defense. In
either case, the author underlines the importance of the United States maintaining a strong grip
on events in Japan and the region: “The United States and its friendly Allies must continue to be
secured against the possible resurgence of Japanese aggression and Japan must continue to be
secured against possible Soviet-Communist aggression.”100 A collective alliance, then, was a
convenient option that could bring American partners in the Asia-Pacific region together with
Japan and one another, united by a common goal of anti-communism.
The predominance of security issues was reflected in the composition of Dulles’
negotiating team. When Dulles set off in the summer of 1950 with a small team to begin treaty
negotiations, he borrowed a young colonel, C. Stanton Babcock, from the Army General Staff to
serve as his advisor on military issues. Babcock later recounted, “In our travels to Europe, the
Far East, and to Australia and New Zealand, it became more and more apparent that
acceptance...of a generous peace treaty depended, very materially, on the drafting of strong
security pacts which would satisfy the nations which had been victims of Japanese
aggression.”101 Dulles’ briefing papers, prepared for him by State Department planners who had
labored over treaty drafts prior to Dulles’ appointment as a special negotiator, also included the
recommendation for a multilateral security pact to be negotiated alongside the peace treaty.102 A
“Interim U.S. Position in Relation to a Peace Treaty with Japan.” 2 May 1950, Box 1,
Folder “Butterworth’s Treaty Files”, Records Relating to the Treaty of Peace with Japan, RG 59.
100

101

Major General C. Stanton Babcock (1904-1979), 1964, JFD Oral History Collection.

It is important to scrutinize Butterworth’s testimony carefully, as he personally had a
low opinion of Dulles due to Dulles’ tenure as Secretary of State. Butterworth, nevertheless,
confirms that the eventual negotiation of several bilateral alliances was not the original plan
prepared for him—Butterworth himself disagreed with this move as he felt there was no easier
102

73

Jin 74
collective alliance, akin to NATO, could simultaneously solve the dual issue of assuring wary
allies about Japan’s reinstatement and initiate a security order in the region for the future.
Nowhere, however, did Korea feature in those security pact ideas.
Military disadvantage was a major reason behind American disinterest. On November 3,
1950, Acheson drafted a statement that attempted to analyze the events in Korea in context: “As
far as the future position in Asia is concerned, it would seem that we must now more closely
limit ourselves to areas subject to sea and air power, which fits our natural role.” America’s
intervention on land in Korea, then, was a grave mistake in Acheson’s eyes. Similarly,
Acheson’s statement reveals an intense feeling that the U.S. had few partners it could rely on in
Asia, declaring that it was “important to accelerate some understanding with Australia and New
Zealand, the only two dependable countries in the Pacific Area.”103 Acheson’s beliefs towards
the limited capacity and reliability of Asian nations cut directly against any plans for a Pacific
Pact. If the Secretary of the State felt positively about only the two predominantly white
countries in the region as potential members of an alliance, there was evidently little of the
necessary enthusiasm needed to inaugurate a pact. Acheson’s language, too, hints at larger racial
assumptions about whether non-white, formerly colonized countries were could be
“dependable.” The belief that non-white Asian nations lacked the sophistication or political
experience to be dependable American allies would also have especially limited Acheson’s
interest in a multilateral arrangement.

time for the U.S. to pull off a multilateral alliance than in 1950-51. Butterworth, W. Walton
(1903-1975), 1965, JFD Oral History Collection.
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Acheson’s concerns about land involvement were echoed by Defense officials. A January
4, 1951 memo cited a meeting between State Department officials and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
“[T]he Joint Chiefs made it clear that the Pact which they had in mind should be strictly confined
to the island nations of the Pacific (Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, the United
States, and possibly Indonesia)...”104 Above all else, the Defense Department feared involvement
in a war on the general Asian mainland. Its defense perimeter, drawn on the western rim of the
Pacific, reflected that geographical limitation. Accordingly, a Pacific Pact could only involve
those nations where the United States could bring its naval and air power to bear.
Such a cautious attitude would be perfectly understandable prior to the start of the Korean
War and the implementation of NSC 68—the April 1950 document that called for the tripling of
America’s defense budget. However, by January 1951, the United States already had more troops
deployed in Korea than in any other country in the world. The ignition of the war sparked an
immense flow of aid, men, and resources to the ROK. Such a transfer of capacity and
commitment to Korea could not be easily reversed, especially as the situation on the peninsula
stabilized and the dramatic gains and losses of the early months of the war settled into a
stalemate roughly along the thirty-eighth parallel. For what reasons would Korea be excluded
from broader security designs in 1951?

b. The Impact of the War
American involvement in Korea, under the banner of the United Nations, had direct
implications for future security designs in Asia. Korea, itself, transformed dramatically in the
Emphasis added. “Memorandum from Allison, Subject: Pacific Pact.” 4 Jan 1951, Box
1, Folder “Defense Dept-Correspondence With”, Records Relating to the Treaty of Peace with
Japan, RG 59.
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ensuing upheaval and violence. After the June 25, 1950 invasion of South Korea by the DPRK,
the U.S. faced a decision of whether or not to intervene in the conflict. The Truman
administration entertained a number of possibilities, including whether the invasion was a Soviet
ploy to test American resolve. But Korea’s strategic position relative to Japan raised the
possibility of a communist threat sitting across a narrow strait to the Japanese home islands,
which would have been unacceptable for American security plans.
Additionally, the American intervention was also motivated by concerns of preserving
American prestige in Asia. On the day of the North Korean invasion of the South, Dulles and his
advisor John M. Allison were visiting Tokyo in early treaty negotiations with Japanese leaders.
Merely a week earlier, both diplomats had visited Seoul in a show of American support for the
Rhee regime. Dulles and Allison, only hours after hearing news of the North Korean invasion,
issued an urgent telegram to Acheson:
It is possible South Koreans may themselves contain and repulse attack and, if so,
this is the best way. If, however, it appears that they cannot do so then we believe
US force[s] should be used...To sit by while Korea is overrun by unprovoked
armed attack would start a disastrous chain of events leading most probably to
world war.105
The tenets of containment rested upon an American show of force wherever necessary. The
psychological factors at stake were more explicitly stated in a telegram several days later from
Acheson to U.S. embassy diplomats: “Importance of the Korean situation not great from
strategic standpoint, but as symbol of strength and determination of the US it is vital.” The
United States would commit to the ROK’s defense, not for Korea’s sake, but in order to present

Telegram from Tokyo to the Secretary of State, 25 June 1950. Box 4, Folder “1.
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the image that American partners would be supported against Communist aggression.106 Such a
move would reassure Japan as well as noncommunist states in the Asia-Pacific. Korea,
regardless of the reasons, was now at the forefront of American involvement in Asia.
But the realities of American commitments on mainland Asia remained and the reversals
in the Korean War confirmed American pessimism that its advantages lay in the sea and air. The
PRC intervention in Korea in late October 1950 dashed American hopes for a quick end to a war
and reignited the belief that the U.S. simply did not have the capacity to win a large-scale land
war in Asia. As UN troops streamed back to the thirty-eighth parallel and Chinese attacks
destroyed the 8th Cavalry Division at the Battle of Unsan, Acheson authored his November 3
memorandum cited earlier, where he claimed that the U.S. should stay away from commitments
in areas on the contiguous Asian mainland. However, Acheson continued in that memorandum
by arguing that the U.S. should hold parts of South Korea regardless of the cost as a defeat would
“put Japan in a position where the nation would probably reconcile itself to falling into Soviet
communist orbit.”107 Far from launching the ROK to the center of American future interest, the
course of the Korean War actually confirmed American beliefs that any Pacific Pact should
explicitly not involve the Korean peninsula. Korea remained important, militarily, only in
context of securing Japan.
The uncertainty involved with commitments in Asia directly influenced American
diplomats when considering the nature of the Pacific Pact. The dangers in Asia meant that there
was a smaller margin of error involved with negotiating a multilateral alliance that would have
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unequivocal definitions on the nature of American involvement in the region. The pact retreated
from the ostensible purpose of its name and settled back into the role of permitting the
completion of the American-led negotiations of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and serving as a
tool in Dulles’ toolbox. Although memoranda and policy proposals still used the same label—
"Pacific Pact”—that Chiang Kai-shek, Quirino, and Rhee had used back in 1949, the Pacific Pact
proposals under American guidance of 1950-51 were motivated by fundamentally different
reasons.108 It appeared to have the same window dressing as the Pact proposals of 1949—and by
extension—the North Atlantic Treaty, but this new pact was not an objective in itself. A Pacific
Pact tethered to the San Francisco Peace Treaty was intended to allay the suspicions of potential
partners, and to demonstrate that the United States was potentially willing to support nations in
the Asia-Pacific even when it had no material commitments it was prepared to offer. Such an
instrument was necessary given the risks of being definitive and purposeful.
Early setbacks in the Korean War also increased the need for propaganda efforts that
would assert American solidarity in Asia. A January 4, 1951 memo co-authored by Assistant
Secretary for the Far East Dean Rusk circulated through the State Department, outlining the
benefits of a “Pacific Declaration”. A Pacific Declaration would be thematically linked to
proposals of a security-based Pacific Pact, but in effect be entirely separate and disconnected
from the requirements of any multilateral alliance. “A declaration of purposes, which did not of
itself establish the machinery for collective security, would be drafted primarily for its
propaganda effect,” the memo states. “It would therefore be designed to dramatize the
community of interests of the nations participating, [and] their concern for the peoples of
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Asia.”109 There are several layers of analysis which to parse through here. Firstly, the declaration
would serve to reassure anxieties among Pacific nations about American security guarantees
through symbolic gestures, making up for the absence of tangible movements towards effecting
an alliance. Secondly, the use of the verb dramatize indicates both Rusk’s own feelings regarding
the lack of actual communal interests among Asia-Pacific nations, as well as reaffirming the
declaration’s role as a propaganda tool.
Additionally, the memo reveals that any declaration, and a subsequent pact, would be as
much directed at the participating nations as it would be for a broader audience. “...every effort
should be made to convince nations in Southeast Asia, for instance, as well as the people of
China, that the interests of the people of Asia were [of] concern [for] the [pact’s] members.”110
The Far Eastern division of the State Department had circulated a similar memo in December
1950, advocating that “The psychological effect in Asia of a Pacific Declaration would be
particularly important at the present time. It would tend to strengthen the non-Communist nations
of Asia, to counteract the loss of prestige suffered through events in Korea, and to encourage
resistance in Communist-controlled areas.” The memo also argues that the participants of the
declaration would be chosen in order to signal to Asian nations that the United States was open
to the idea of committing itself to anywhere it needed to in Asia.111 Ambiguity about American
intentions and limits, again, served the State Department well at a time when there was no
consensus about the extent and long-term plans of American designs. Additionally, a statement
Emphasis added. “Memorandum from Rusk and Emmerson, Subject: Pacific Pact.” 4
Jan 1951, Box 1, Folder “Defense Dept-Correspondence With”, Records Relating to the Treaty
of Peace with Japan, RG 59.
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of purpose and an affirmation of the community of interests between the U.S. and nonCommunist Asia, regardless of the actual absence of actual feelings of camaraderie, could bolster
America’s prestige in Asia.
In a time when reversals in Korea demonstrated how the sheer gravity of a misstep in
Asia, the United States faced the task of simultaneously ensuring that noncommunist resolve
would not collapse while refining security designs to avoid a future catastrophe. In a National
Security Council report dated May 17, 1951, the NSC outlined its belief that American
involvement in Asia had both direct effects—countering communist aggression—and
psychological importance. “The effect of the Korean struggle upon the military and political
prestige of the participants is of the greatest importance to the course of events in other parts of
Asia.”112 Korea could not be abandoned, for the sake of America’s standing abroad and Japanese
security. But its potential as a key member of American grand security designs for the future of
Asia was distinctly limited by its difficult strategic station.

c. Korean Relations with Japan
Furthermore, Korean involvement in a Pacific Pact would have required addressing the
nature of ROK relations with Japan. Resolving outstanding issues that contributed to the
acrimony between the two nations was far easier said than done. Throughout the negotiation of
the San Francisco Peace Treaty, American diplomats underplayed Japanese war responsibility,
which was a necessary aspect of the U.S. strategy of reinstating Japan without reparations.
Korean nationalism, Rhee’s anti-Japanese public demeanor, and understandable resentment
towards Japan as well as Japanese insouciant attitudes certainly contributed to acrimonious post-
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war relations between the ROK and Japan. But American officials had low expectations that
Rhee’s diplomacy with Japan would be productive as well as little interest in promoting Korean
interests. As a result, Korean-Japanese diplomacy remained unproductive, and limited the
possibility that the ROK could successfully present itself as an attractive member for a
multilateral alliance that would involve Japan. Once again, American diplomats sidelined Korean
concerns, by perceived necessity, because while Korea may have been the crucible of American
military intervention in Asia, Japan was the cornerstone of American grand strategy.
Rhee, publicly, had contradicting stances towards Japan. On the one hand, he saw the
need for a potential anti-communist partner. On the other hand, the pressures of public antiJapanese sentiment, as well as his own interest in presenting himself as an ardent Korean
nationalist, led Rhee often to espouse anti-Japanese rhetoric.113 American diplomats thus had
good reason to believe that Korean motivations ran directly counter to the U.S. effort to prioritize
Japanese recovery. As recounted in Chapter 2, these views were evidenced by the American
report of the brusque ways the Korean minister to Japan attempted to gain an audience with the
Japanese government in October 1949.114
However, there was also a push within the ROK government to integrate itself in Asia
regionally and even to restore relations with Japan. There was a concerted effort within the Rhee
government to establish better avenues of contact with the Japanese directly. This was, in part,
due to Korean perceptions that an American-sponsored dialogue would be biased against ROK
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interests. In September 1949, Rhee stated in a press conference that “Because there are some
Americans who like Japan, they act in favor of Japan in some points.”115 The ROK initiated
several attempts beginning in October 1949 to generate trade with Japan, as well as an exchange
of Japanese technicians and anti-communist intelligence-sharing. The American response to
these overtures was mixed. Marshall Green, an analyst at ONAA in the State Department,
commented that the Korean efforts may “disclose a genuine concern on the part of Rhee…and
other Korean leaders for closer ties with Japan. An almost isolated bit of anti-Communist soil in
the North Asian continent, Korea has a good reason to look for a friend in Japan. Such a KoreanJapanese rapprochement would seem to be in U.S. interests.”116 At the same time, however, a
SCAP diplomat added his belief that these Korean overtures were of dubious value.117 Green
himself admitted that “[Japan] has traditionally viewed the Koreans bordering on contempt,” and
that animosity along with the low practicality of Korean-Japanese intelligence sharing would
doom a Northeast Asian anti-communist front before it could get started.118
ROK efforts to turn a new leaf in ROK-Japanese relations increased with the growing
threat of the DPRK and especially after the start of the Korean War. In a February 1950 visit to
Japan, Rhee himself emphasized the need for cooperation in light of the threat of communism
115
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and concluded several trade deals with Tokyo.119 One year later, after Korea had experienced
firsthand the instability and violence of the early months of the war, the ROK took efforts to tone
down its own concerns. The ROK National Assembly became increasingly aware that the United
States planned on excluding Korea from both a Pacific Pact and the peace treaty. This awareness
led the Assembly to pass several motions indicating that they would have no objection to a
Pacific “alliance” that would include Japanese armed forces. In other words, Japan could be
rearmed, so long as Korea was not left outside of a pact’s defense line.
The U.S. embassy submitted dispatches summarizing the assembly’s legislative
proceedings, including the transcript of one Korean assemblyman who stated that in the interest
of creating a Pact with the United States and Japan, “[w]e must discard the nationalistic
sentiment we have had in past days.”120 The accompanying commentary by the American
ambassador, John Muccio, remarked that “[t]his is evidence of the strong pressure which
developments have brought on Korean thinking; such a concept would have been impossible
several months ago and would undoubtedly have been yelled down in the Assembly.”121 To
harken back to earlier State Department criticisms of the Chiang-Quirino-Rhee proposals for a
Pacific Pact, it appeared that the Korean War was leading a majority of the ROK’s legislative
political power to discover a “common purpose”, even with a former archenemy like Japan.
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The State Department did not facilitate or support the renewed Korean interest in
rapprochement with Japan. On at least one occasion, American authorities in Japan refused to
grant entry visas to Korean assemblymen who intended to visit Japan on a diplomatic mission,
rebuffing this attempt at Korean-Japanese diplomacy.122 By July 1951, the extent to which
Dulles and State Department officials in Washington had excluded Korean interests motivated
Ambassador Muccio to pen a sternly-worded complaint back home about his own country’s
conduct. “Korea supposedly [a] liberated nation and Japan the ex-enemy; it is in US interest to
attain stability [between] both countries. Yet I note [that the] most difficult problems affecting
relations [between] Japan and the ROK are being shelved as far as the treaty is concerned…”
Muccio, in the interest of ROK-Japanese relations, argued that the signing of the peace treaty
should even be delayed to allow time for a bilateral treaty between Korea and Japan to be signed
concurrently.123 Obviously, Muccio’s telegram made little headway in the department, but it is an
indication of how much American diplomats themselves felt frustrated with State Department
policy that dismissed the need to promote ROK-Japanese relations.
Geopolitics synergized with American cultural attitudes as well as pessimistic
perceptions of the Rhee regime, producing a clear preference to avoid involving Korea in a
would-be Pacific Pact. American beliefs of Korean incompetence in the political sphere did not
improve when Rhee’s military collapsed early in the war and then became subordinate to an
American-led command. The deep criticisms of many in the State Department towards the ROK
is expressed well in a November 1950 memorandum penned by the American vice consul for the
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U.S. Embassy in Korea: “The government which Koreans feel we [Americans] sponsor is at an
all-time low in popularity with its own people and does not appear able to exercise effective and
accepted leadership in solving the staggering problems of unification and rehabilitation unless
important changes and reforms are effected.”124 In the American view, Rhee’s government was
unreliable, ineffective, and an encumbrance.
While concerns about the ROK’s international legitimacy momentarily gave reason for
Dulles’ team to seek Korean participation in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the motivations for
a security pact were tilted towards generating practical, military advantage. In other words, it
was easier for Dulles’ team to exclude Korea from discussions of military pacts rather than the
treaty, because the concept of a mutual defense agreement was vulnerable to domination by a
realist, balance-of-power mindsets and since Korean officials could not claim a “moral” right to
be included in a defense agreement. The ROK’s sacrifices in the war against the communist
threat in Asia was not enough to foster feelings of solidarity from Dulles’ team, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, or relevant policy-movers in the State Department. All of this engendered an
environment where American planners continued to maintain their distance, all the while
negotiating treaties and pacts that drew their borders outside of Korea.
It was in that vein that Dulles’ team never seriously considered a Pacific Pact that would
have included one of its most vocal, early supporters. The American intervention was not out of
any specific interest in Korean concerns, but as an element of the broader effort to combat
communism and make a demonstration on a global scale that the United States would stand by
noncommunist states in the Asia-Pacific. This framing of intervention in Korea, American
pessimism about the ROK’s vulnerable strategic position, and the belief that Korean concerns
“A Memorandum Concerning United States Political Objectives in Korea.” 30 Nov
1950, Box 1, Seoul Mission and Embassy Misc. Classifieds, RG 84.
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obstructed true American goals in Asia, all resulted in Korean exclusion from the discussions of
a multilateral alliance. Korea itself had few rhetorical resources to call upon to argue for its
inclusion in a pact beyond vociferously aligning itself with the cause of anti-communism.
The Pacific Pact idea itself had fallen apart by early April 1951. On April 17, Acheson
announced a reversal of American policy in a telegram to the U.S. Embassy in Indonesia, noting
that Dulles now intended to negotiate a series of bilateral agreements with interested parties. It
cites several reasons, including earlier logic that a multilateral arrangement could be damaging
for relations between the U.S. and nations that fell outside of the alliance. The language of the
telegram, however, also points to other assumptions that underpinned American decisionmaking. “[A] series of agreements will provide basis of evolutionary development of larger
regional arrangement, if such an arrangement has any basis in reality.” Additionally, “[The] new
approach...has the additional advantage of avoiding [the] position of being merely the first
among equals.”125
Despite the fact that the plans for a Pacific Pact in 1950-51 emanated from the State
Department, the same objections that Acheson had towards the Rhee-Chiang-Quirino pact
proposals remained. The statement that a larger regional collective might have no “basis in
reality” recalls previous American conclusions that potential Asian participants were only really
interested in obtaining a tangible form of American commitment, rather than any stake in
strengthening bonds between them. Finally, the United States sought to retain its flexibility, even
as it became involved with events on the far edge of its periphery in East Asia. The U.S. had
outsized responsibilities and subsequently saw itself as the heavyweight in a relationship. Like

“Telegram to the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta,” 17 April 1951. Box 31, Folder “Pacific
Pact 1949-1950”, Files Relating to U.S. Participation in SEATO, RG 59.
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the bilateral tendencies in the negotiation of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the U.S. favored
dyadic relations where it could maximize its influence against a smaller power.

III. Conclusion

To reassure Pacific countries about a “rehabilitated” Japan, the U.S. was willing to float
the idea of a broader collective alliance, with both economic and military aid flowing from
Washington to its Asian partners. There is no evidence that earlier American pronouncements
about the absence of Asian collective spirit was anything more than a convenient rhetorical
phrase at the time. In doing so, however, the State Department delineated an alliance in the AsiaPacific as an Asian idea, promoted by Asian advocates for Asian needs. The Pacific Ocean, for
the State and Defense Department, was a frontier dividing the U.S. from Asia rather than a
common denominator with its own centripetal force. If and when the U.S. found itself interested
in exerting a leadership role in Asia, it would do so solely on its own terms rather than in pursuit
of a broader multilateral idea. While Rooseveltian ideas still had weight in the negotiation of the
peace treaty—with all its ideological connections to equality between nations, rehabilitation, and
peace in the world—calculations of geopolitical security never allowed any such space in the
negotiation of a defense arrangement for the region.
With the start of the Korean War and the crystallization of American grand strategic
commitments in the Asia-Pacific through the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the U.S. in turn
coopted the Pacific Pact idea. But under American direction, the pact was little more than a
means to an end—the end being American domination of Japan’s strategic capacity and
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reassurances that the U.S. would be ready in the unlikely event that Japan had imperialist
ambitions in the future.
With little consideration given to the mechanics of a collective organization and with no
interest in developing broader security ties between Asian nations, it was inevitable that the
Pacific Pact proposals would be shelved during the treaty negotiations and replaced with far
simpler and preferable bilateral agreements with key nations in the Asia-Pacific. The U.S.
government’s ironclad requirements that it maintain a distance from risky endeavors and make
room for ambiguity, subsequently, ensured that a multilateral alliance was fundamentally illsuited for American preferences. In the context of American ignorance of Asian, especially
Korean, concerns stemming from their experiences in the war in the Pacific, Japanese
rehabilitation and reinstatement as a sovereign state had to occur within the carefully-controlled
confines of American bilateralist negotiating methods. For American diplomats, introducing
other elements, like addressing issues in Korean-Japanese relations, would have caused
unnecessary delays. With the conclusion of a peace treaty and bilateral agreements in Asia, the
United States had decided its path in Asia, even as the final cinders of America’s multilateralist
moment had turned to ash.
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Epilogue

A remarkable document included in the files of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in the
National Archives is a letter to John Foster Dulles from an individual named Kozo Abe, a
professor based in Tokyo and the spokesman for an informal group of Japanese intellectuals.
Mailed from Tokyo six days before the conference, it is unknown if Dulles ever read it, although
its inclusion in the archives meant that his secretary certainly received it. The letter stated the
group’s opposition to Japanese rearmament, asking that Dulles instead support the cause of
permanent peace in the world. It decried the absence of reparations in the peace treaty draft,
claiming that it disregarded the interests of Asian peoples seeking to rebuild an Asia “destroyed
by the Japanese army and navy.” Abe acknowledged how little he could hope to influence the
conference proceedings, but nevertheless pleaded that the peace treaty and its accompanying
security treaty “may isolate Japan from all other Oriental peoples, present a great threat against
the peace of the world, and endanger the real independence of Japan.”126
Abe’s misgivings about the peace treaty stem from how the United States positioned
Japan within the American defense structure in Asia. By itself, we cannot take Kozo’s letter as
representative of either the Japanese public, or even the intellectual class. However, it does
demonstrate that some observers even within Japan believed that the American diplomats behind
the peace treaty were not taking broader Asian grievances into account. By speeding up the
process of the return of Japanese sovereignty and ignoring residual wartime resentment, Japan

Letter from Kozo Abe to the ‘Chairman of the San Francisco Peace Conference’, 3
Sept 1951, Box 3, Folder “Letters Sent to Conference”, Files Relating to the Treaty of Peace
with Japan, RG 59.
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faced a future of isolation. But Abe’s feared-Japanese isolation was itself the result of a broader
diplomatic mechanism at work, where the peace treaty served as an instrument that would bring
the Cold War to Japan and, in doing so, remove American involvement from the process of
Japanese reconciliation with World War II. Despite American dominance of politics in Northeast
Asia at the time, it would be up to future generations of Korean and Japanese political leaders to
restore normalized relations.
American exclusion of Korea from the peace treaty and the would-be Pacific Pact may
have isolated Korea, but it also isolated Japan. No multilateral framework was in place to share
the burden of reestablishing ties between Japan and its Asian nations. Nor was the arena set to
promote intra-Asian cooperation. The peace treaty represented a key moment when the United
States firmly chose to avoid handling intricate, morally-difficult, wartime questions. This choice
was not merely the result of realpolitik mindsets or at the urging of any one individual, but rather
an institutional outcome that derived from decades of America marginalizing Korea and having
few concrete plans to uphold the lofty multilateralist rhetoric that the State Department had
espoused during World War II.
The Rooseveltian idea of sovereign nations equal to one another despite differing levels
of capacity was firmly substituted with the reality that America now saw the world through a
Cold War lens. Putting a de jure end to the war with Japan was vital in pursuit of implementing a
new Cold War strategy, and not as an objective in and of itself. To the rejoicing of some, like the
group of Japanese businessmen who visited Nebraska in early 1952 and lauded the treaty for not
being that of a “conqueror’s”, and to the dismay of others, like Kozo Abe, the United States was
eager to pronounce Japan “rehabilitated” and ready to bear the responsibility of the anticommunist crusade. There had occurred a premature end to a conversation of how to address the
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history of Japanese colonialism, and how Japan should interact with countries that it had
formerly controlled.
U.S. reception of and later proposals for a Pacific Pact, a would-be NATO in Asia,
demonstrated the extent to which the framing of issues in national security terms could obliterate
multilateral idealism. Although the United Nations had intervened in the Korean War ostensibly
on behalf of the ROK, Korea—despite all of its interests, concerns, and claims of moral
redress—merely served as a symbol of American commitment to anti-communism in Asia. The
State Department actively ignored Korean issues and concerns whenever such matters impeded
the grand strategic timeframe. Korea transformed from a colonial state to a partner of the U.S.,
dependent solely on American interest in a bilateral relationship to survive. Cultural attitudes
may not have been the primary decider of American grand strategic actions, but they lent
credence to the same conclusions American diplomats reached through myopic Cold War
mindsets. American ignorance of Korean concerns gave all the more reason to sideline those
issues during the treaty and pact negotiations. Giving the ROK a voice, as Dulles might have
described it, would have opened a Pandora’s Box of unaddressed issues that would unacceptably
delay the advancement of American grand strategy.
When there was a historic moment for the United States to engineer ROK-Japanese
reconciliation, American officials balked. As the image of Communism rolling across Asia
burned itself in their minds, resolving the bitter legacy of Japanese control of Korea was a low
priority. The requirements of the Cold War, mixed with an inadequate American appreciation for
what constituted a valid World War II experience in the Asia-Pacific, culminated in the decision
to exclude the Republic of Korea from the San Francisco Peace Treaty.
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In the nearly seventy years since the peace treaty, South Korea and Japan have both
remained as central figures in American strategy in Asia. A deployment in Korea or Japan is
common for American military personnel. American foreign affairs are intertwined with Japan
and South Korean policies, due to persisting security concerns in the region. Japan and South
Korea put together played host to a whopping thirty percent of American military personnel
deployed overseas in 2017. Despite the closeness of both countries to the United States, charged
issues stemming from Japan’s history of involvement in Korea and perceptions of historical
revisionism have plagued the efforts of some American planners to build a trilateral alliance
between the three. Colonial and wartime legacies have not disappeared with time, but instead
have festered and mutated despite some attempts to resolve the animosity.127
American actions in 1950-51 represent a missed chance, as American diplomats chose to
follow the expedient course of action, sharply curtailing the extent of high-minded visions for a
postwar Asia. The U.S. had set the foundations for its grand strategy and discovered a concrete
base from which it could respond to the uncertainty, chaos, and contingency of events in the
Asia-Pacific. But Pandora’s Box could not be kept closed forever, and the casualties of U.S.
grand strategy in East Asia have continued to haunt the present day.
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South Korea and Japan reached an agreement in 1965 to normalize relations, which
included Japanese “reparations” in the form of soft loans and economic aid. The ROK was then
under the dictatorship of Park Chung-hee, who used Japanese reparations to promote his
country’s development. This has complicated questions of reparations and redress for specific
Korean victims who were not individually compensated and feel that Japan’s government has
remained unrepentant of the past.
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